THE NEW REVOLUTION.

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NEW REVOLUTION

OR THE

NAPOLEONIC POLICY IN EUROPE.

"SI VIS PACEM, PARA BELLUM."

BY

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PREFACE.

With the exception of a few connecting pages, the contents of this volume are reprinted from Blackwood's Magazine and The Press newspaper.

As much that was unthought of or discredited when the articles appeared is now becoming visible as fact, the middle chapters are preserved exactly in their original form, with the dates prefixed.

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NAPOLEON THE THIRD.

"THE good fortune of Napoleon III.," said M. Guizot recently, "makes one doubt the genius of Napoleon I." The saying may be a clever *mot*, but it is nothing more. The two Napoleons are essentially different in constitutional temperament, and in the career possible to each. The one has been likened to the Cæsar, the other to the Augustus of the French empire. But, much more aptly, the parallel may be drawn between the Napoleons and the two great founders of the shortlived "universal empire" of Macedon: the crafty and sagacious Philip being paralleled by the present monarch of France, and his more brilliant son by the flashing genius and dazzling

career of Napoleon I. The genius of such men cannot be tested by the same standard; and the fame of the Uncle will not be imperilled even though the wary ambition of the Nephew be crowned by a greater measure of success than we have the desire to see.

Amidst the general and well-founded apprehensions which prevail in this country as to the ulterior designs of the Emperor Napoleon, it is satisfactory to remember that England cannot be charged with excess of jealousy or lack of generosity towards him in the past. It was the countenance of England which made steady his throne on his first accession to power. England was content to regard his former vows of "avenging Waterloo" and completing the "mission" of his Uncle as ebullitions of youth, or the chafings of repressed ambition; and she accepted his solemn assurances of unalterable friendship, and of a desire for peace, as a proof that the responsibilities of power had extinguished the visionary ambition of his earlier years. A British Minister hastened to congratulate him on the success of the *coup-d'état* before that daring stroke had been

condoned and ratified by the votes of the French nation; and after his dictatorship had received the national approval, the Government of England at once accepted his sovereignty without reservation. The Conservative party in the British State, of whom Napoleon is now so jealous, were even foremost in repudiating natural suspicions and according to him the right to be judged by his acts. And if they, in common with the majority of the nation, now regard the Emperor with distrust, it is only because his recent policy leaves no doubt as to his ambition, and because his professions can no longer be accepted as an index to his designs.

Were the ambition of Napoleon III. to culminate and end with the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the British public would not regard this Imperial aggrandizement in a grudging spirit or with very minute criticism. But it is considered, with reason, as but the first step in the development of a far-reaching policy of ambition which, if successful, will not stop until it shall have come into warlike collision with our own country. By the correctness or incorrectness of

this belief must be decided the question as to the wisdom or folly of the policy pursued by the Palmerston Ministry. We do not indeed see how, in any case, England could with honour stand aloof and permit the Emperor of the French to single out in succession the Continental Powers as the prey of his ambition; yet if England could do so, and be safe herself in the end, such a policy would have sufficient pecuniary advantage to commend itself at least to the disciples of the Manchester school. But if, as we believe, such attacks upon the Continental Powers are necessary preliminaries to an attack upon our own country—which cannot safely be assailed until it has been alienated from allies—then a policy which has regarded with connivance or complacency the aggrandizement of Napoleon, and does not seek to strengthen the menaced position of Europe by consolidating our alliances in those quarters where alliances are still open to us, is one of which the folly will soon be manifest, though its consequences cannot fail to be both serious and lasting.

The new phase of the Napoleonic policy is

amply expressed by the altered tone of the Imperial manifestoes. For a long time the burden of those manifestoes was, "the Empire is peace," —"the age of conquests is passed,"—"woe to him who shall disturb the peace of Europe!" Now it is quite different. The Emperor has proclaimed with his own voice that his mission is "to *restore* France to her true place among the nations," and that it is not only justifiable but befitting on his part to go to war "for the defence of great national interests—religion, philosophy, and civilization; and that the interest of France is everywhere where there is a just cause, and where civilization ought to be *made* to prevail." The championship of "justice and civilization, religion and philosophy," is certainly as vague a programme of policy as ever was submitted to the world. The words may mean nothing or everything. Europe, we fear, will find that they do *not* mean nothing,—and that the vagueness is quite intentional on the part of his subtle Majesty of France. There is not anything in the actual words which cannot be diplomatically explained into nothingness; and yet they

contain, and are meant to contain, the germ of as many aggressions upon other States as Napoleon may find himself in a position to carry out. Who is to decide what "civilization" is, or when and how it ought to be made to prevail? Will not the championship of so ambiguous a cause justify Napoleon in supporting Russia in aggrandizing herself at the expense of Turkey?—perhaps, also, of incorporating Portugal, the ally of England, with Spain, the friend of France? Will not the plea of "justice" entitle him to assail Germany in order to win for France the frontier of the Rhine?—and also aim a blow at the maritime ascendency of England, by demanding the cession of Gibraltar to Spain, and of the Ionian Islands to the possessor of the adjoining coast? And as for "religion," will it not furnish him with a pretext to excite revolt in Ireland, whenever it may suit him to apply a hostile pressure to Great Britain?

It is important to remark the manner in which this new phase of Napoleonism will affect the position and influence of England. England, as a military power, can play but a small part in the

affairs of Europe; but hitherto her moral power has been very great. Her rivals on the Continent are despotic governments, all of them more or less in dread of revolutionary movements in their own or adjoining countries. England held the match which could explode some of those revolutionary volcanoes; and once one of them is fairly in action, there must ever be a great likelihood of the others blazing up too. This was the sword of Damocles with which Canning once threatened the Continental Powers when they were disposed to carry matters against us with a high hand; and unquestionably, however loth to use it, it has always been a weapon in our armoury which, if pushed to extremities, we could use with terrific force. *Now* the case is changed. Napoleon, who knows the power of this weapon better than any one, has been working successfully to get it out of our hands. He knows that his policy and ours are likely to clash ere long; and he justly dreads to have such a weapon turned against himself. A despot at home, he seeks to reach his ends piecemeal by short wars, and by flattering both imperialism and democracy without breaking with

either. And he greatly dreads a general war, which might become a war of opinions, exciting the democracy of France and imperilling his position, by compelling him to become the open foe either of liberty or despotism. He has taken from England the sword of her moral power, and wields it boldly but warily for his own purposes.

Mr. Cobden, in his speech on Mr. Horsman's motion last autumn, said that he was ready to vote a hundred millions if he saw any Power preparing to attack this country. We doubt not Mr. Cobden was in earnest when he made that profession. Even Mr. Bright, we believe, with all his millennial ideas about peace, would be ready to shoulder a musket if the French were besieging his cotton-mills. The patriotism of these gentlemen is perhaps sound enough, if one could only get at it. But unfortunately it lies stowed away behind blinding prejudices and bales of crotchets, far beyond the reach of ordinary use. We all see things in the light of our dominant ideas, and a mental telescope that is very good for showing some things, may be very bad for showing others. If one is wrapt up in dreams of millennial peace,

and in theories which maintain that the nations have grown too wise to go to war any more, it is very hard to get such a one to see facts, however patent, which run counter to his ideas. The Philistines will be upon him before he will believe that they have laid aside their ploughs and their pruning-hooks. He has no ear for the distant rumble of muffled cannon, nor for the sound of the enemy working under ground; and the chance is that the masked batteries will open, or the mine will explode, before it occurs to him to take steps to meet the danger. France and England are in very different positions at present as regards warlike establishments. When Austria, during the negotiations, proposed a general disarmament, the French Government replied that it could not do so, as "France had never armed;" yet the instant war was declared, the Emperor was able to forward into Italy an army capable, in conjunction with the Sardinians, of overpowering in Lombardy the whole available forces of the great military empire of Austria,—while a powerful separate expedition of land and sea forces entered the Adriatic,—and an army of 160,000, with 400

cannon, was ready under the Duke of Malakoff, not only to guard, but if necessary to assume the offensive on the frontier of the Rhine. The Italian war at least taught us this, that the French Emperor is quite ready to *make* a war when it suits him, veiling his purpose to the last under professions of peace, and can *on the instant* engage in it with most formidable forces.

We have every desire to stand upon friendly terms with France; but England must not allow herself to be deluded by a phrase. What is the French "alliance?" Is it an offensive or defensive one, or what? It is simply a phrase. We are no more in alliance with France than we are with Russia, Prussia, and Austria. We are at peace with France—that is all,—and we have every desire to continue at peace with her, if she will let us. But we must beware of mistaking phrases for facts. It is the game of Napoleon to keep up the phrase of the "Anglo-French alliance." It serves, at least it has long served, to lull us asleep, and it has hindered us from making friends in other quarters. Russia severed from us in 1856,—Austria in the spring of 1859,

—and now Spain and Denmark are likewise gone from us. Are we to sit supinely by and see this process of alienation from us and of aggregation to France continue, till the whole Continent is arrayed in an attitude of hostility or indifference? Or in truth has not this calamity already befallen us?

It is a mistake to think that, in his present policy of ambition, Napoleon III. follows his own interests, as opposed to the desires of France. Napoleon III. is too wise ever to dissociate himself from the national sympathies. He will give effect to those desires in the manner most advantageous for himself, but he will never disregard them. Deriving his throne from universal suffrage, and centring in himself the whole powers of Government, he seeks in his policy to give expression to the fundamental desires of the French nation. He pays regard, not to a clique in the capital, nor to the coteries of self-seeking parliamentary chiefs, which his immediate predecessors were too apt to mistake for entire France, but to those enduring aims and interests which lie at the bottom of the national character of the

French people. He has frequently disregarded and repressed the superficial fret and fume of the nation, for he knows that it would hurt himself as well as them if he were to become their leader in a race that starts from folly. But he will ever join with the tide—nay, he anticipates its rising and leads it — in cases where he knows the national feelings are truly implicated, and where he sees he can conduct them to a prosperous result. His personal interests, so far from being opposed to such a line of conduct, constitute his strongest motive for adopting it. His main motives of self-interest are, to keep himself on the throne, and to leave a dynasty behind him; and this he can only hope to accomplish by ruling France as France wishes to be ruled,—by conducting the imperial policy in accordance with the national desires, and with the vigour and ability requisite to carry that policy successfully to its goal.

Since the commencement of 1859, his cherished aims have begun to manifest themselves; and as the Emperor is already past the time of life best fitted for action, it may be expected that

he will seek to accomplish his projects without delay. In the following brief chapters we have endeavoured to exhibit the character of the man, and the workings of his bold, subtle, and far-reaching policy. In those portions which relate to the future, we proceed on surer grounds than if we affected to assume the prophet's mantle. Show a geometrician the smallest part of a regular figure, and however many angles or sides the figure may have, he will quickly construct it in its entirety. Give Professor Owen a single bone of bird or beast, and after due thought he will describe the animal to which it belonged. So is it also with the affairs of nations. *Given* the interests of a Government, with its power and opportunities of carrying them into effect, and the inferences from the past action of that Government will suffice to reveal the designs which it contemplates in the future.

Napoleon III. does nothing by accident or impulse. His uniform professions of a desire to maintain friendship with this country, not only help to maintain that friendship so long as he desires it, but, when the rupture comes, they

will greatly contribute to throw the blame off him upon us. When that time comes, we doubt not he will turn round upon us with most imperial coolness, and say, "You are an ungrateful nation—all along have I sought to propitiate your friendship, but now I can bear with you no longer." And in an Imperial pamphlet he will appeal to Europe whether he has not behaved to us most loyally, and whether such falseness and arrogance as ours can be tolerated by the commonwealth of nations. He will take credit for having stood by us and saved us during the war with Russia,—for having remained friendly to us throughout the great crisis of the Indian revolt, —and, even when our press preached regicide and sympathised with Orsini, for having restrained his infuriated army that longed to invade the "asylum of assassins," at a time when our army was in India and our fleet was inferior to that of France. He will pretend that his conduct on these occasions was so many friendly sacrifices on his part (whereas they were necessary links in his far-seeing policy), for which England has requited him with nothing but ingratitude.

Such is the man with whom we have to do. He fights from a vantage-ground. He is not only by far the ablest head in Europe, but he can work towards his ends with a steadiness and secrecy which are impossible to the Government of this country. As long as war is not actually imminent, a Government cannot publicly proclaim its suspicions or convictions as to the insincerity of other Powers. Hence it is at all times difficult for a popular Government like ours to be ready for a sudden conflict; whereas a despotic monarch can maintain the language and semblance of peace until his forces are actually ready to march, and his fleets to sail. This disadvantage on our part is more especially to be remembered when we have to deal with France under its present ruler. From a French point of view we have no complaint to make against Napoleon III. He is only doing what any other French ruler would do, if possessed of the same genius. But if the character of his policy be such as we believe it to be, it concerns this country to be on its guard. Nearly a year has elapsed since Lord Lyndhurst—the Nestor of the Peers—the

venerable statesman upon whom more than upon any other has descended the senatorial influence of the "old Duke"—warned the country of its danger, and called upon the national representatives to do their duty, if they would not see a calamity overtake this country such as would never be forgotten in the world's history. And recently, the magnificent oration of Sir E. B. Lytton, and the impressive peroration of Mr. Disraeli's speech on Reform, exposed anew the magnitude of the peril which threatens, and the subtle manner of its approach. Most sincerely do we trust that those Demosthenic appeals will not be lost upon the country, when it stands, as now, face to face with the veiled ambition and formidable armaments of the modern Philip.

CHAPTER SECOND.

IS IT PEACE?

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ENGLAND is prone to peace. The trade-spirit is eminently pacific; it is slow to take offence, and never allows pride to interfere with gain. Commerce is an international communion of *self-interest*, and therefore the most potent antagonist of all wars. England is the workshop and commercial centre of the world; her sympathies are all in favour of a reign of peace, without which her world-wide trade of buying and selling is cramped and rendered less profitable. Hence it is that, alone of all the countries in the world, England exhibits a Peace Party—a class of politicians whose supreme and distinctive business it is to oppose all war, and advocate peace "at any price." The error of these men consists in believing that all nations are as far advanced in, and as peculiarly devoted to trade and commerce as ourselves;

whereas the refusal of other nations to adopt our principles of free trade, and the fact that no other country has a Peace Party but our own, ought to apprise them of the peculiarity of our position. Moreover, they are so ignorant of human nature as to pay no regard to moral differences. Commerce trades as freely with oppressors as oppressed, —it makes no difference between slave and free; and the Peace Party cannot understand why slave and free should not be equally friendly with one another. Holding their peculiar opinions, indeed, that party are consistent enough when they clamour for disbandment of fleet and army, and urge England to go to sleep unarmed in presence of her foes; but their principles are alike too sordid and too Utopian, too utterly inconsistent with the great facts that surround us, to find acceptance with the practical good sense of the community at large.

The end of civilization is Peace. The goal of civilized progress is peace among the nations, even as peace among individuals is its beginning. What history shows us accomplished in single communities, will ultimately, we trust, be esta-

blished among the States of Europe. Slowly but steadily the work of national development is going on, elevating the units of the masses from the automatic condition of early society into thinking and self-acting beings; so that nations are becoming more and more conscious of their true wants and interests, and more and more powerful to enforce and secure them. Civilization, that short phrase for many ideas—for increase of population, improvement of agriculture, growth of commerce, rise of wealth, development of law and justice, spread of knowledge, and increase of locomotion and international communication—ever tends to throw down local barriers, to draw the nations into friendlier bonds, and engage all in a communion of self-interest. Acting first upon individuals and single communities, its tendency ever is to widen its sphere of influence, and ultimately embrace all States belonging to the same platform of national existence. Look at the transition from England under the Heptarchy to the United Kingdom of the present day. In like manner, Burgundy, Normandy, Provence, have become merged in a united France; the

crowns of Castile, Arragon, and Navarre are now united on one head in Spain; and the Germanic Confederacy and commercial bonds of the Zollvrein are the commencement of a corresponding aggregation among the still unconsolidated Teutonic States. As this work of internal consolidation and national development goes on, the civilized energies of a people project themselves beyond the seas or their own frontier, and seek to form commercial union, founded on self-interest, with other countries. For long, English capital has sought and found investment in every country of Europe, thereby increasing our interest in the preservation of tranquillity; and other countries have of late begun to follow in our steps. France, within the last few years, has made a great start in this direction, and other states are slowly following. It is easy to see that as this intercommunion of commerce and speculation extends, —as the surplus capital of each country becomes invested in the others, and as the commercial firms throughout Europe come to depend more on one another, or indeed amalgamate in "European" companies—the various States will approximate

to a community, of which the members will be as closely related as provinces of the same country were at the beginning of this century.

Among states so closely related, international war will gradually die out. That is the tendency,—but the end is afar off; and we must beware the error of acting as if we were at the goal, while we are still upon the journey. The end may be seen afar, like a star guiding us homeward; but they are fools who, the moment they catch sight of that distant star, throw off their harness, as if the troubles of the night and the dangers of the way were already over. Such, it appears to us, is the conduct of that section of our politicians who are known by the name of the Peace Party. They do not consider the many obstacles to be overcome, the many shocks to be encountered, ere Europe reach that almost millennial haven of peace. They do not consider the widely diverse circumstances of its component States,—that while one end of Europe is rapidly nearing the goal of civilization, the other has hardly yet started on the journey; and consequently that the pacific tendencies of the highly

civilized nations, if unguardedly indulged, only place them more at the mercy of nations less advanced, or more fond of military glory.

Wars are often nothing but rapids or cataracts in the stream of civilization, occurring when unyielding matters cross its course, and hastening, not hindering, its progress onward to the goal. Morally considered, the kingdoms of Europe resemble a series of plateaus of different heights, upon which agencies are at work reducing them to a lower level; and convulsions are inevitable as the various States, each for itself, make the transition to a broader and safer basis of power. As the units of the population develop into thinking self-willed beings, they naturally throw off those fetters and leading-strings which suited them in their state of pupillage, and grow into a self-acting community. The British nation has run through this course, not without civil war and political convulsions; but, happily secluded by the sea from foreign intervention, and aided by the practical spirit of compromise natural to the Anglo-Saxon race, they have at length reached the broad level of individual freedom and popular

government. The pyramid, once poised unstably on its apex, now rests on its base. In this respect we stand alone among the nations of Europe; but each and all of these are on the road, and will reach the goal in due time, and after their own fashion. Even Russia, where the masses are still serfs and automatons, has exhibited an evanescent thrill and convulsion from the popular passion (prematurely caught by contagion from western Europe in 1815-18), and not all the power of the Czars will suffice in the future to stop its onward progress, leavening and descending deeper into the masses of Russian society. Next to Great Britain, if we omit the small states of Switzerland and Belgium, we unhesitatingly place our northern kindred, the Scandinavian Powers, as possessing popular rights fully acknowledged, and a political constitution which works without convulsions. France comes next: there the national will is supreme after a fashion, but as yet it has only learned to make itself felt imperfectly or by revolutions. Spain is still torpid—Italy is nobly reviving—Germany has not arrived at its ultimate natural state. Germany will never be in stable rest

till it obtain the constitutional form of government promised in 1815, and simplify the organisation of the Fatherland at the expense of the petty Courts which at present eat up its revenues, divide its energies, and furnish so favourable a field for the influence of foreign diplomacy. Prussia may part with her present individuality in return for the coveted leadership of Germany; but on the map of the future will there be any stable or abiding place for Austria? She is but a political fabric with no basis to rest upon, either of nationality or geographical configuration. No community of race or of feeling binds together the varied populations of that empire, and as these populations become more developed by the action of civilization, will they not draw asunder and range themselves along with the national groups to which they belong—Germanic, Slavonic, and Italian?

We write these things in no idle spirit of conjecture, but to show the fallacy of the Peace-dreamers, and to indicate the insecurity of the basis upon which rests the peace of the Continent. Howsoever the Manchester party may desire to

spin their cotton or loan their money in perpetual peace, there are causes at work in the world which will ruthlessly demolish their dreams. We take no disconsolate view of the future. We have a sufficiently lively faith in the wisdom of the Divine government to believe that Providence will order the ways of the world a great deal better than the best ideal which Mr. Bright can suggest. We believe Europe is travelling on a good though rough road, and fancy we can discern a happy goal to her journey. But what we assert again and again is the perilous folly of those who would have this country act as if a millennial peace already existed in the world around us. Even as the end of civilization is Peace, so the end of religion is Love; and week after week the heavenly doctrines of love, brotherly charity, and universal philanthropy are expounded and enforced from our pulpits. But what sane divine would exhort his hearers to act in daily life as if the reign of universal love were already established? or what sane hearer would follow the exhortation, and venture to dispense with bolts and bars and police, even in this most civilized coun-

try of all the earth? Yet the trust we would not put in one another, the Peace party think we may safely place in alien Powers! Surely the events of the last twelve years ought to teach us the visionary nature of such delusions. The rude wars of peoples against their governments, and of governments against their peoples and one another, may show us how far off yet is that end of civilization which bringeth peace. Peace in Europe is a-coming,—so we trust; but certainly it is not yet within hail. Its white sails may be seen glimmering in the far horizon, as if coming towards us from the heavens of the future; but many a wild billow and hurricanous gust will yet break on the European strand, ere that white-winged messenger of glad tidings cast anchor in our havens.

Whenever the dreams of the Peace Party are realized, it will first be among the christianised communities of the White race of Europe,—that "upper crust" of the world, who acknowledge in each other equals and fellows of the same dominant caste. Each of these communities has had its day of power. Greece once conquered by arms, and still conquers by its heirlooms of in-

tellect. Rome subdued, and spread the seeds of civilization throughout the ancient world. Spain and Portugal first subjugated the seas, and overran the gold regions of the New World. France has twice threatened Europe with domination, and is now spreading her sway over northern Africa. Britain, a little island, has done more than they all. Russia has already done much, and will soon do far more. Even Scandinavia once sent her conquering rovers to every shore, and subsequently turned the tide of battle in Germany in favour of the Reformation. Germany is the sleeping giant of the European system, never having established her unity, but ere long she will take the high place that belongs to her in the community of the White oligarchs. All these peoples—all the members of the far-spread European race—regard each other as equals. Those that are weakest now have at one time been greatest; and if actual equality of *power* be not present, it is felt that at least the power has been there, and may return. The subtle Greek, more famed for duplicity than for manly virtue or learning, is respected as having once been great, and still makes himself

distinguished in the pursuits of commerce. The indolent Spaniard is known to have had his epoch of chivalrous gallantry and far-reaching enterprise, and the manly virtues still live in the population, though its leaders be corrupt. Neither does any one despise the Italian, once celebrated alike in art, in arms, and in polity,—in whose veins nationality and patriotism are now panting, and whose recovery of freedom may inaugurate a new development of the national genius. Indeed, the three peninsular kingdoms of Southern Europe—Greece, Italy, Spain—after long lying like exhausted fields, seem about to quicken after their fallow, and join again in the race of progress which they once led,—in the stately march of National Development, which, proceeding in early times westwards along the shores of the Mediterranean, thereafter turned northwards, and, after culminating in Britain and France, is now running eastward again through the central region of Europe.

December 1856.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE NEW REVOLUTION.

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I.

February 25, 1860.

TEN years hence the public of Europe will look back to the present time as the commencement of the most momentous epoch of the nineteenth century—of an epoch in the politics of Europe second only in importance to that which was inaugurated seventy years ago by the first French Revolution. Those of our statesmen who discern what is impending, are condemned to silence by the very magnitude of the far-reaching series of events now opening to their view. As the leaders of parties, as chiefs in the Parliamentary Government of England, they hesitate to call forth from the nation an explicit declaration of opinion such as would force the British Government into a decided line of policy, and thereby exercise for good or evil a critical influence over the course of

future events. Wisely or unwisely, they conceal their own convictions, and decline to place the British public face to face with the momentous changes in the European system which are contemplated, and, we believe, impending. Even though exempt from such high responsibility, we have hitherto preferred to deal rather with the outer edges of the new policy which is coming into play, than to expose that central principle, the application of which is about to cast Europe again into the revolutionary crucible. But if there be one duty more than another incumbent upon the press of a free country, it is to enlighten public opinion, and to interpret to the best of its ability the signs of the times.

We think it right, therefore, to declare our conviction that the Governments of Europe are face to face with a new Revolution—a revolution not designed to affect so much the elements of society as the condition of empires. It is a revolution which will seek to accomplish in more subtle form and more wary fashion the schemes of the great Corsican. France is again its centre, and a Napoleon again its chief.

We desire to render justice to Napoleon III., even while we believe the last sweep and crowning stroke of his policy, if successful, will be directed against the interests of England. He is bent upon a lofty game. He aspires to put all Europe to rights, by a series of *coups-de-main.* He aspires to act the part of a Providence in the affairs of Europe. He aspires to redistribute the power, and to re-arrange the possessions, of the European States in a manner which he conceives will conduce to the general wellbeing, and which will certainly augment the power and enhance the position of France. He knows—every one must know—that the "New Revolution" cannot be accomplished peaceably. He knows that none of the great Powers—that no independent State—will voluntarily submit itself to the readjustment of his imperial hand. He knows that he can only play the part of Providence by arrogating to himself the right to wield the most terrible of the Divine scourges—war. And he is resolved to wield that scourge—more warily and less presumptuously than his Uncle, but with a view to the attainment of the same objects.

He serves himself heir to his Uncle. Again and again, in works of masterly thought and mature deliberation, he has set himself to vindicate and justify in every tittle his great Uncle's policy. With the persistency of a fatalist he held to the belief that he should one day mount the throne of France. He regarded himself as set apart by Providence to vindicate, by completing, the Napoleonic scheme for regenerating Europe and exalting France. Having placed himself upon the throne and consolidated his power, he now applies himself in earnest to the accomplishment of his "mission." Until a year ago he was content to dissemble and to wait. Few great men—or men who deemed themselves great—have respected the common notions of right and wrong. Napoleon III. does not stand alone in conceiving that the end justifies the means. He has acted upon that principle from the first—he will act upon it still. He who solemnly swore fealty to the Republic was also the author of the *coup-d'état.* He who solemnly proclaimed that the "Empire is peace," was the same who conspired with Cavour to produce the Italian war.

He who proclaimed at Milan that he made war only for an "idea," and sought no addition to the territories of France, had five months before signed a secret agreement for a dismemberment of Sardinia by which Savoy and Nice were to be added to his dominions. So he has acted, and so, O English public! he is acting still.

His mission has commenced. Powerful and sagacious—at the head of the finest army, and backed by the most homogeneous nation in Europe—at once a general in the field, and in the cabinet more than a match for the ablest diplomatists—with Sardinia for a dependant and Spain for a friend—he feels the ground firm beneath his feet, and begins to propound the first clause of his new Constitution of Europe. The basis of that proposed constitution—the principle of the New Revolution—involves the destruction of all existing treaties. The "Rights of Man," as understood by the Convention, was the idea developed by the first Revolution; the Rights of Nations, as interpreted by Louis Napoleon, is the corollary idea which the New Revolution proposes to realize. Brooding in profound contem-

plation over the state of Europe, he has discerned the tendency of the populations to disregard the demarcation of political arrangement, and to segregate or agglomerate themselves in obedience to the instincts of individuality and the affinities of race. He sees that this tendency will increase until its object be accomplished; but that if matters be left to take their ordinary course, it will be a long time before the new system establish itself, and Europe settle into a new state of equilibrium. For his own fame, and for the aggrandizement of France, he is resolved to expedite the process, and convert the new power into an agency for the accomplishment of his ambition.

It is the "idea" of the nineteenth century, and he adopts it as the basis of his policy. Himself and France are to be its champions. They are to be the *Deus ex machinâ*. It is the "sword of Brennus" that is to cut the political knots which are supposed to fetter the peoples, and by a series of wars, "short, sharp, and decisive," to save Europe from the protracted crisis of a more natural process of dissolution and

regeneration. Such is the special idea of Napoleon III. We do him the justice to believe that he hopes from it ultimate benefit to Europe. But he cares little for the present cost, when France is to be the gainer. He is not so cosmopolitan in his views as to disregard the special interests of France, nor so unselfish as to forget his own. France and himself — Napoleonic France, is the stand-point from which he regards the interests of Europe. It is to magnify himself and consolidate his dynasty that he is bent upon placing France once more at the head of Europe. This is his object, and the New Revolution is the means he adopts for its accomplishment. It is the means most suited to the times. After a long rest Europe has grown unquiet. Elements of discord are in every State. The fabric of power established in 1815 is loosening. Napoleon assumes the dictatorship of Europe, and intervenes to hasten the dissolution. He assumes the lead in overthrowing the old edifice, in order that he may have the lead also in reconstructing the new one, and reconstructing it to his liking.

France contains the most homogeneous nation

in Europe. There are no separate nationalities which long to be sundered. Napoleon takes his stand upon this fact, and he shapes his aggressive policy in accordance with it. He makes it the handle of the sword with which he purposes to carve Europe to his liking. He does not, like the first Revolution, proclaim popular rights or republican institutions. He cannot be the champion of internal freedom, for his own government is a galling despotism. But in the principle of nationality, in the desire of nations or communities to emancipate themselves from an alien rule, he finds a safe and potent lever for assailing the existing fabric of European power. He has begun to work that lever: bit by bit he will work it further till all Europe totters. And he trusts to his astute diplomacy, and to the might of his armies, to aggrandize France amidst the general disorder, and to reshape the territories of his neighbours in a manner conducive to his own glory and convenient for the development of Gallic ambition.

A despot, and yet the elect of his nation, he can avail himself by turns of very different allies.

He closed the Crimean war by obstructing his ally and conciliating his foe. And after the Congress of Paris, he stood erect in the sight of Europe leaning with one arm upon free England and with the other upon despotic Russia. He plays the same game still. When he wishes to coerce Italy, he supports the demands of Austria; when Italy becomes pliant to his wishes, he adopts the policy of England. In the one case he justifies himself by solemn professions of regard for existing rights; in the other, he as solemnly protests that France cannot support any régime opposed to the wishes of a people. Each State in turn he plays with or abandons, as suits his plans for the time. The Governments of Europe he makes his dupes,—the discontented nationalities are his tools,—and the European Commonwealth is the living body upon which he operates and dissects. The Governments are played off against each other,—the Nationalities are intrigued with or repudiated,—and Europe is plunged into war or replaced in peace, according to the shifting requirements of his double-faced policy. Such are the tactics of the leader of the

New Revolution. And the aggrandizement of France, and his own prestige as the arbiter of Europe, steadily make way.

It is Savoy and Nice now. It will be the Rhine frontier by-and-by. And in due time, when he has severed England from her allies—when he has tempted her to aid him by her countenance or neutrality while attacking the other Powers, he will lift the curtain from the last and crowning act of his secret policy, and direct the principles of the New Revolution against herself. The Ionian Islands claim to unite themselves with Greece,—Gibraltar is an integral part of Spain,—the Channel Islands are a natural appanage of France, and their people speak French. Such is the reasoning that will then be directed against ourselves; and the "sword of Brennus" —backed by Imperial stores of our own coal and iron—will be invoked to enforce it.

All Europe dreads war—trembles at the thought of it. France alone has shown that she is ready for it. Magenta and Solferino were samples of her prowess designed for the instruction of Europe. They are banners which she

holds up defiantly, to deter all who would stop her path. They remind Europe that the days of the Empire have returned,—that France has again an army and a Napoleon. They proclaim, "Woe to that Power which shall seek to scare the Eagle from its prey." All Europe is arming,—but all Europe holds back from the path of the Gallic Eagles: and the New Revolution continues to work. How will it end? There is but one issue probable. Napoleon may scheme and cajole as he may,—he may dream of short wars, and congresses, and peace, but never yet was a policy like his carried out without leading to a Great War. Desiringly or not, he is opening the flood-gates: but when the deluge of blood subsides, will his throne be still seen standing on encrimsoned Europe?

II.

March 3.

TWENTY years ago Prince Louis Buonaparte stood arraigned before the assembled Peers of France. Death seemed the only issue of the trial, for the penalty of death had been fully incurred. Twice had he attempted by violence to subvert the Government of the "Citizen King," and his second attempt, like his first, had signally failed. Reprieved the first time, on condition that he exiled himself across the Atlantic, he had broken that condition by returning to Europe; and though both his attempts upon the throne of France had miscarried notably, the Orleanist dynasty felt that the crisis was perilous. At that very time, when the Prince stood arraigned before the Chamber of Peers, the mortal remains of his great Uncle were on their way from St. Helena to find an honoured resting-place in the soil of France. Old memories of the Empire were stirring in men's minds. Thiers was writing its history; and people began to contrast the monotony of the Monarchy with the exciting glories of

the Empire. Two generals of that illustrious period stood enrolled amongst the peers. Marshal Excelmans refused to sit in judgment upon the Nephew of the Emperor; Soult, more impassible, and bound by official ties to the Government, took his place: but tears were in many eyes as the condemned Prince rose to speak. It must be said he bore himself like a hero. "I had no accomplices," he said,—"alone I conceived the enterprize. If I am to blame towards any, it is to my own friends." He exculpated every one,—Montholon, Persigny, all his companions; and deliberately justified himself. In his proclamation, when making the attempt at Strasburg, he had said—"I have consecrated my existence to the accomplishment of a great mission. From the rock of St. Helena a ray of the dying sun has passed into my soul. I shall know how to guard this sacred fire: I shall know how to conquer or die for the cause of the people." And now, with his life in his hand, he proclaims still more boldly the same mission. "I represent before you, gentlemen, a principle, a cause, a defeat. The principle is that of the sovereignty of

the people,—the cause is that of the Empire,—the defeat is Waterloo! You have recognized the principle,—you have served the cause,—the defeat you would avenge!"

The young man—for he was then but in his thirty-third year—was in earnest, there could be no doubt. The world set him down as a fanatic and a fool; but he was destined to make the world revise its opinion: he was yet, to use his own words, to "have a page of history to himself,"—and it will be a page the most memorable in the nineteenth century save one, that which records the career of his great relative and prototype. The heir of Napoleon, though with no resemblance to the classic features of the great Corsican, he had early begun a career of aggressive conspiracy. At twenty-one, he and his elder brother had headed the Carbonari in a revolt against the Papal Government, in which his brother fell fighting by his side, and from which he himself escaped, after showing unquestionable bravery. Next he offered his sword to France; but the Government declined to receive him into the French army. When the Polish Revolution

broke out, and Walewski—a natural son of the Emperor by a Polish lady—came to invoke the aid of France, Louis Buonaparte went to take part in the contest; but while he was on his way, the bloody capture of Warsaw terminated the struggle, and saved him from death or Siberia. Six years afterwards he made his first attempt upon the throne of France at Strasburg; captured and exiled, in other three years he lands again at Boulogne to claim by arms the throne of his Uncle. "Frenchmen!" said his proclamation, issued in the grey of that morning of 6th August 1840, "the ashes of the Emperor should not come save into a regenerated France. Glory and liberty should stand erect beside the coffin of Napoleon." With an honourable but ill-requited clemency, the Orleanist monarch spared the life of the bold visionary; and in his captivity at Ham, the Prince continued to dream of empire—to trust in his star. And his star did not fail him.

On the 20th December 1848 Louis Napoleon again stood, the centre of all eyes, in the Legislative Chamber of France. Not this time arraigned for his life, but the Elect of the French

people. The Revolution had opened to him the soil of France,—he had become a member of the Assembly,—he was now about to be installed President of France. He owed his election to his name. The eloquence of Lamartine, and still more the sword of Cavaignac, had saved France from being plunged back into the anarchic horrors of 1793; but their names were hardly known beyond the limits of the capital, and the masses of the population knew them not. Cavaignac especially was hated by the Reds. But Napoleon was a name of power everywhere; and amongst the ignorant peasantry many even thought that it was their old Emperor come back again! And so, by the votes of the masses, he was chosen to be chief of the Republic. But the Assembly distrusted him. A Socialist in some of his writings, and asserting the "sovereignty of the people" in all, they yet remembered that his cause was "that of the Empire," and that his model was the First Napoleon. They were apprehensive lest he should overthrow the second Republic, as his Uncle overthrew the first. It was with premeditated solemnity, therefore, that the President of

the Assembly administered to him the oath. "I invite," said he, "the citizen President of the Republic to ascend the tribune and take the oath." Standing, he read the following majestic formula:—"In presence of God, and before the French people, represented by the National Assembly, I swear to remain faithful to the democratic republic, one and indivisible, and to fulfil all the duties imposed on me by the Constitution." And then, before the whole Assembly, breathlessly silent, the citizen Charles Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, raising his right hand, said, with a firm full voice, "*I swear it!*" The representative Boulay de la Meurthe, who had known Louis Napoleon from his childhood, exclaimed, "He is an honest man; he will keep his oath." The President of the Assembly, still standing, said—"We take God and man to witness the oath which has now been sworn." The ceremony seemed complete, when the citizen Louis Napoleon asked permission to address the Assembly; and, unfolding a paper, read a speech which terminated thus:—"The suffrages of the nation, and the oath I have taken, command my future conduct. My

duty is clearly traced out: I will fulfil it as a man of honour. I shall regard as enemies of the country all who seek to change by illegal means that which entire France has established." Whereupon the Assembly rose and cried out, "Vive la Republique!"

The powers of Europe had bound themselves by treaty never to recognize a Buonaparte upon the French throne. But they did not act up to their pledge; and the just and wise policy of England was thrown into the scale to balance and moderate the not unreasonable jealousy of the other powers. Thus France and her master were left to settle the question of internal government for themselves. The President, like his Uncle, professed that his sole desire was to "heal the wounds of the Revolution," and maintain in its integrity the republican form of government which the voice of the nation had established. When he first took his place as a member of the Assembly, he mounted the tribune and said, "All my life shall be devoted to the confirmation of the Republic." And a few days previous to his election as President, he issued a manifesto, in which he

declared—"I am not an ambitious man, dreaming of empire. . . . Educated in free countries in the school of misfortune, I shall remain ever faithful to the duties imposed upon me by your suffrages and the will of the Assembly. . . . My principles are entirely republican. . . . I shall devote myself entirely and thoroughly, *without reservation*, to the strengthening of the Republic." The assurances which he gave before his election, the vows he solemnly made on his installation, he continued to repeat. In his message to the Assembly on the 13th November 1850, he said that "he regarded as great criminals those who by personal ambition compromised the small amount of stability secured by the Constitution; that every one was at liberty to seek to hasten the revision of the fundamental law, *except himself;* that the first duty of the authorities was to inspire the people with veneration for the law, by never deviating from it themselves; and that his anxiety was not to know who would govern France in 1852, but to employ the time at his disposal, so that the transition, whatever it might be, should be effected without agitation or disturbance."

Those pledges so manifold and explicit, so solemnly made and so often reiterated—how did he keep them? The facts reply. On the 2d December 1851 the Republic was at an end,—the National Assembly dissolved, and its members in arrest. By a military *coup-d'état*, Louis Napoleon had overthrown the Constitution, and made himself Dictator.

"*Je suis sorti de la Loi pour rentrer dans le Droit*," was the epigram with which he justified his conduct. We shall not discuss the moral aspect of the question. The votes of the French people, given in universal suffrage, ratified his dictatorship; and we have never entertained a doubt as to the practical benefits which France derived from the consolidation of her government by the dictatorship. It is quite another question which arrests our attention. It is not to cast a slur upon the personal character of Louis Napoleon that we have exhibited in so striking a form the contrast between his professions and his conduct. It is that we may draw from that contrast a deduction of pressing moment. It is that the British nation, and the public of Europe, may understand the

exact value which they ought to attribute to the pledges of the French Emperor, by showing in what light they are regarded by himself.

We are on the eve of great changes, great events. The New Revolution is already at work, and every month will more demonstrate that it is no chimera. Another epoch in the development of the aims and policy of Louis Napoleon has yet to be traversed ere we reach the present situation. But already our survey of his career has shown that vows and pledges with him apply but to the hour of their utterance. No assurance of friendship the most explicit,—no oath the most solemn,—no treaty the most recognized, is any guarantee that his ultimate conduct will accord with it. He limits its validity to the circumstances of the hour. And of these circumstances he constitutes himself the sole judge. He does not ask France—he does not consult Europe, whether the change of circumstance be such as to release him from his pledges—nor even whether there has been any change of circumstance at all. He is an autocrat who sees no moral restraints either in the treaties of Europe or in his own professions.

He is a law unto himself, and it is an unrevealed one. Treaties and oaths do not bind Napoleon III. Without warning, if it seem good to himself, he ruptures them at a stroke,—by the sword of despotism or by the cannons of war.

III.

March 10.

SAVOY and Nice are to be annexed to France. Such is the declaration of Napoleon to the French Chambers. The treaties of 1815 are being torn up in succession by the heir of the great Corsican. Last year he broke the peace in order to break also the treaties of Europe, and abolished with the sword that part of them which regulated the territorial system of Italy. This year he gives to the winds another and the most solemnly contracted of all those treaties, by preparing to seize Savoy and the passes of the Alps—thereby menacing the independence alike of Switzerland and of Italy. Napoleon—who can now doubt it?—is bent upon subverting piecemeal the territorial arrangements of Europe, and reasserting the tyrannous domination of France at the first Revolution. The very terms in which he demands these provinces declares this. He "reasserts his claim" to Savoy and Nice—he "demands them back as territories unjustly taken" from France.

Such is the precise meaning of the verbs *reclamer* and *revendiquer* which he employs in making his demand. Savoy and Nice were the first conquests of the Convention—they are in like manner to be the first spoils of the new Revolutionist. Louis Napoleon holds that the boundaries of France under the First Empire are her natural right. The Alps are approached. The Rhine is not inaccessible. The New Revolution progresses.

The "mission" of Louis Napoleon is a drama in two acts. When raised to the sovereign position of his Uncle, his first object was to overthrow the political constitution of France; his second is to subvert the territorial constitution of Europe. In accomplishing either of these objects his method is the same. He allays suspicion by profuse and solemn pledges — consolidates his power—and then deals the fatal blow. We have seen with what oaths the most solemn he guaranteed the constitution of France, and with what despotic violence he destroyed it. A similar method marks his conspiracy of attack upon the treaties of Europe.

When Louis Napoleon, dictator of France,

aspired to the Imperial crown, he knew that it was indispensable for him to disarm the suspicions of the other Powers, who would naturally apprehend that with a revival of the Empire there would be a revival also of its traditions and policy. The Powers were right in their suspicions, but he set himself to propitiate by deceiving them. "L'Empire c'est la Paix" was his memorable declaration at Bordeaux. All his conquests, he then said, were to be at home, in subduing nature and reclaiming the wastes—his only soldiers were to be those who should aid him in improving the constitution and developing the resources of France.* And on re-establishing the

* The celebrated address at Bordeaux is now so entirely out of date that it reads like the index to some old almanack. The following is an extract from that speech, pronounced on the 9th October 1852, and which rallied so many to the imperial throne :—"There is one apprehension which I must notice. From a spirit of mistrust, certain persons say, 'the Empire is *war*,' but I declare 'the Empire is *peace*.' Yes! it is peace, for France desires peace; and when France is satisfied, the world is tranquil. Glory may be bequeathed as a heritage, but not war. And at these periods of transition, when on all sides, and with so many elements of prosperity, are so many causes of death, we may with truth say,—*Woe to the man who shall be the first in Europe to give the signal of a collision, of which the consequences would be incalculable!*"

Empire, he proclaimed to Europe, in his address to the French Legislature—"I do not make my reign date from 1815; I accept all which history for the last forty years transmits to us with its inflexible authority." Again—for as usual he was prodigal of pledges—he declared: "The age of conquests is past." "Woe to him who shall disturb the peace of Europe!"

Having allayed the suspicions of Europe, his next object was to consolidate his power—at home, by organizing and increasing his military and naval forces; abroad, by obtaining alliances. The Czar of Russia openly slighted him as a parvenu,—Prussia looked upon him coldly and with distrust,—the States of Germany refused to furnish him even with a bride. Of the Continental Powers, the young Kaiser of Austria was the first to show any friendliness towards him—with what return of gratitude we now see. But it was the English alliance which enabled Napoleon to obtain a place amongst the sovereignties of Europe. But for that alliance, the new Napoleon would have been placed under the ban of isolation, and his schemes of ambition could never

have blossomed into action. England befriended him when he had most need of a friend. What return does she receive for her friendliness?

The war with Russia was the making of Napoleon as Emperor. It gave to him power and position. It revived the military passion, and gave an opportunity to develop to the utmost the military resources, of France; and at its close, he adroitly took up an intermediate position between his ally and his adversary, in such a manner as to conciliate the latter, while compelling the former to go along with him. Thenceforth he had a new ally: the mightiest Power on the Continent, and the very one which hitherto had most contemned him, was on his side. The English alliance had been the shield and buttress of his unstable throne,—next, he had made it a stepping-stone to external power. He now showed that he could do without it.

Paris became the diplomatic centre, Napoleon the grand arbiter of Europe. Soon breaking from England, it appeared as if he had cast in his lot with the despotic Powers. He attacked the free press of Belgium. He sided with the King of

Prussia in opposition to the liberties of the Swiss in the question of Neufchatel. By the Mires Contract he revived the Slave-trade. He instituted the St. Helena medal—a memorial of the Empire and Waterloo. He haughtily set England at defiance in the affair of the *Charles-et-George*, and coerced our old ally Portugal by sending his fleet to the Tagus. Soon after, he let loose the whole press of France against us, at the time of the Orsini conspiracy,—demanding that England should restrict the right of asylum which she had always granted to refugees, and which she had so freely accorded to himself, even though he had wrongfully made it a cover for prosecuting his attack upon the former Government of France. His pretensions grew with his power. The same year, ere its close, witnessed the hatching of a new development of the Napoleonic policy. And, bursting its swaddling-clothes, in 1859 the new French Empire entered upon its genuine career.

Napoleon this time made Russia his prop and tool, as he had previously made England. The good understanding which he had established with

the Czar at the expense of England during the Congress of Paris he consolidated into a virtual alliance by the mission of Count de Morny to St. Petersburg. He had hooked his fish and began to play it. Firm in his position, he planned a new scheme of ambition—he conceived a new field for the Gallic eagles. Hitherto he had been the supporter of existing rights, alike by his professions and by his acts. He had proclaimed that he accepted all the treaties of Europe, as established by the "inflexible authority" of the past. And it was avowedly in defence of those treaties that he engaged in the war with Russia. Suddenly changing his course, the curtain rose upon the Second Act of the Imperial drama.

Every summer Napoleon withdraws from the gaze of the public and the entourage of ministers, to recruit his health at the watering-places of southern France. The seclusion is turned to good account. In his retirement at Plombières, in July 1858, he summoned to his private councils the Prime Minister of Sardinia, Count Cavour, the avowed foe of Austria, the ardent champion of Italian independence. And in those private

councils he planned with the daring Sardinian statesman the Italian war. Five months afterwards, he invited his "ancient friend" Lord Palmerston in similar fashion; and amidst the hunting-forests of Compiègne he obtained the concurrence of the British statesman and Premier-expectant in the projects which he professed to have in view. With Cavour, Napoleon planned a war; with Palmerston, he spoke only of a diplomatic pressure in favour of Italian liberty. But to neither did he unfold his whole game. Hardly had the duped statesman of England made his adieus to his Imperial host, than the headstrong King of Sardinia, at a military review, exhorted his troops to perfect themselves, as he might need their services in spring. And immediately afterwards, while the Sardinian arsenals already rang with the din of preparation, Napoleon took occasion, on his New Year's Day reception of the foreign Ministers, to make an open breach of amity with the Austrian Government. Significant events trode rapidly on each other's heels. A matrimonial alliance was suddenly announced as about to take place between the Courts of France

and Sardinia. And while military and commissariat supplies were daily arriving at Toulon—while troops were recalled from Algeria, and the French men-of-war summoned back from all quarters of the globe, the nuptials of Prince Napoleon and the Sardinian Princess were celebrated at Turin; and on embarking with his bride at Genoa, the Prince proclaimed that, "in evil fortune or in good, the two nations were now allied as well as the dynasties."

It was then rumoured, too—and is now known—that a secret agreement was made between the French and Sardinian Governments; and this now notorious *pacte de famille* stipulated that in return for expelling the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia, France should be permitted to annex Savoy and Nice. Count Cavour signed the *pacte* on the part of King Victor Emmanuel; General Niel was commissioned to sign it on behalf of the French Emperor. But Count Cavour (as we know on good authority) demanded a more imperial authentication of the agreement, and at last the document was ratified by the signature of the Emperor. "*Maintenant je le tiens!*" was the

remark of Cavour to a brother minister, who demurred to such a contract. He reckoned that Napoleon would be pliant from a dread of exposure. But his partner in the game was a far more daring player than he thought.

What need to detail the diplomatic farce which followed? What need to describe the masks assumed by the Imperial plotter against the peace of Europe? The British Cabinet saw through the disguises, but Napoleon set them at defiance. On the 14th January he refused to accept the mediation of England on behalf of peace. And when Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Austrian Government to all that the French Emperor professed to require, a telegram from the Tuileries invoked the obstruction of Russia by getting her to propose a congress. That proposal, said Prince Gortschakoff in a subsequent circular, was made "in order to meet the wishes of the French Government." At length convinced that France and Sardinia were bent upon war, and only waited for the complete melting of the snows on Mont Cenis, the Austrian Government despatched

an ultimatum to the Court of Turin. An ultimatum is not a declaration of war, and during the Crimean contest Austria presented so many ultimatums to Russia that we had to coin the word *ultimatissimum*,—and yet Austria never drew the sword. But all that Napoleon wanted was a pretext. And while the Austrian Government, at the last moment, accepted anew the mediation of England, and stopped the march of her army until she should receive the answer of France, Napoleon, while pretending to consider the British proposal, ordered his troops to cross the frontiers, and then, having got several days' start of Austria, haughtily rejected it. "France has not armed," he had said, yet his army, perfectly equipped, crossed the frontier immediately. "Austria," said he audaciously in his subsequent proclamation, "by entering the territories of our ally, attacks us." But so far was Austria from being the first to cross her frontier, that the French troops entered Savoy *five days* before the Austrians crossed their boundary-stream the Ticino. And the French vanguard entered Susa (within an hour's travel of Turin), and the French fleet landed

Bazaine's division at Genoa, *more than three days* before the Austrians made a single step across their frontier. In fact—as may be seen in the contemporary correspondence of the *Times*—there were 70,000 French troops in Sardinia, and Parma, Modena, and Tuscany were all in revolt by Sardinian agency, before ever the Austrian army crossed the Ticino.

In this manner it was—by deliberate plan, and amidst dishonourable pretences and subterfuge—that Napoleon commenced his career of military aggression. The French eagles were again in Italy. A new Napoleon mustered his legions on the fields of Montenotte and Marengo.

IV.

March 17.

LOUIS NAPOLEON believes in the great Contest of Opinions predicted by his Uncle; and he is resolved to anticipate and to lead it. By so doing, he hopes to give to it a State instead of a Popular character,—to make it an orderly though violent, instead of an anarchic and revolutionary movement. He desires to forestall the natural march of circumstances; he inaugurates, in order that he may head, the New Revolution. Meanwhile he coquets vigorously with the two opposite principles. He will break with neither party till the hour strikes. He holds on till the cycle of the stars brings round the Great War. Everything is unstable; the European system is reapproaching an hour of dissolution. And he holds himself prepared alike for popular risings and for the leagues of Governments.

This was his grand motive for inducing the Italian War. It was a counter-irritant to internal disaffection,—a stroke for immediate glory,—the pioneer of a future policy. France had associated

herself with the cause of Liberty: how could the traditional idea be better gratified than by waging a war for the "liberation" of Italy? What enterprise better calculated to persuade France that she is still the champion of freedom, although she take so little of it to herself? France, also, is devoured with a passion for military glory; and what glory so captivating as to revive the memories of Marengo and Castiglione, and to see the white uniforms of Austria once more refluent before the eagles of a Napoleon? It was on the plains of Northern Italy that the first Napoleon won those military laurels which prepared his brows for the imperial crown. Upon what field could the second Napoleon more fittingly revive the memories of the Empire, and emulate his prototype as a victorious general? Three months before the outburst of hostilities the Emperor was seen daily riding in the streets of Paris attired in a grey *redingote*, the war-dress of his Uncle. It was a symbol of his resolve,—an omen of what was coming.

But there was a grander design, a more imperious necessity, behind. To divert France from the galling fetters of her internal despotism, and to

gratify the national love of military glory, were motives sufficiently obvious for getting up a war for the "liberation" of Italy. But there was a more special motive, which escaped general attention. An imperious necessity impelled Napoleon III. to a violent solution of the Italian question. He descried a gathering danger ahead, and he resolved to evade by anticipating it. Italy, he saw, could not long continue as it was without exploding in a revolutionary outbreak. The eyes of all the statesmen of Europe had been bent upon the Italian peninsula in foreboding disquiet. A second 1848 loomed ahead. A new outburst of revolution would have been dangerous to almost every Government on the Continent,—but to Napoleon it would have been ruin. *He* could not afford to be surprised by such an outbreak. It was a French army which annihilated the Roman Republic; it was his troops which had kept down Italian liberty in Rome ever since. And if a revolutionary movement like that of 1848 were again to extend over Italy, Napoleon knew that he would have no alternative but to fight against it. He—the "elect of the people"—felt he should be

ruined were he forced to play the despot *pur et simple*. Even though the revolutionary movement were confined to Italy, if it found his army supporting the Papal despotism at Rome, he knew that the issue must be most damaging to his prestige, and most destructive to the meditated projects of his future policy. Hence his resolve to assume an attitude which should free him from the charge of being an upholder of despotism and a foe to Italian liberty.

Louis Napoleon cares nothing for consistency, —his sole object is success. He suits his policy to the times. What matter that for ten years he had held military possession of the Roman States without ever saying a word about reforms? What matter that, in notoriously the worst governed part of the peninsula, and where the people were most eager to be free (and would have been free in a week but for his troops), he had done nothing but shoot or bayonet those who dared to conspire against the double tyranny of

nd Frenchman? Austria was in the Papal by the special invitation of the Papal ment, whereas France had grasped at

Rome unasked. And the Austrian Government a year ago might well have said, and virtually did say, "By your ten years' occupation of Rome you have recognized and acted upon the very same principle as we have done, and against which you now protest. And if you find you have got into a difficulty by your occupation of Rome, and for your own objects wish to withdraw, that is no ground for demanding that we also should abandon our positions, which do not embarrass us in any way." Napoleon threatened to withdraw his troops, but dared not. He dreaded the uprising of the revolutionary party. He preferred to keep his troops where they were, and fasten a quarrel upon Austria,—so as to create a war which might suffice to avert his *bête noir*, another revolution like that of 1848, of which the elements existed in other quarters besides Italy. By engaging in a "war of liberation" he calculated that the whole Italian nation would regard him as their champion, and that the party of Mazzini would disappear,—or, if they dared to raise their head, would instantly be struck down by the mailed hand of France and Sardinia. The French Em-

peror went to war in order to avert revolution. As he "discounted" the projected Socialist revolt in France in 1852 by the *coup-d'état*, so his object a year ago was to discount the impending Italian revolution by an immediate Italian war. Adopting the Jennerian method, he sought to avert a peril by bringing on the dreaded disease at his own time, and in the form to him least dangerous.

It was a masterly conception. For, in addition to all these objects, the Italian war was designed to realize yet another. "French policy," said the Imperial pamphlet published in February 1859, "has traditions which it can never abandon, because they respond to the permanency of its influence. And one of those traditions is, that the Alps, which are for France a bulwark, shall not become an armed fortress against her power. Our former kings understood this, as it was afterwards understood by the Republic and the Empire." It has been something more than a dream with Imperial France to extend her influence as a suzerain over the other two Latinized nations of southern Europe. Napoleon I., while placing his brother Joseph on the throne of

Spain, made his stepson Eugene Viceroy of Northern Italy, his brother-in-law Murat King of Naples, and his infant son King of Rome. Napoleon III. meditated a less daring scheme of ambition. Circumstances had altered. Public opinion had become a power as puissant as the sword: and the sentiments of Europe would not permit so high-handed a policy towards Italy as was carried out by the first Emperor. Louis Napoleon restricted his aims to obtaining Savoy and Nice, with the passes of the Alps. This he was resolved upon,—this, by the secret *pacte*, he had made sure, before ever drawing the sword. But he did not altogether abandon his Uncle's idea of rendering French influence paramount in the peninsula by placing a relative on an Italian throne.

The Duchess of Orleans, in her dying testament, had urged her sons to early marriages. And shortly before Count Cavour was summoned to Plombières, the Duc de Chartres had entered the Sardinian army, and rumour began to speculate upon a matrimonial alliance between him and the young Princess Clothilde, then only in her four-

teenth year, when the pair should have attained a somewhat more marriageable age. Doubtless this did not escape the thoughts of Napoleon. And his desire to prevent the heir of the Orleans associating himself by marriage with the cause of Italy probably accelerated the Imperial message which brought Cavour to Plombières. The royal maid of Sardinia might be too young for marriage in the estimation of the youthful Duc de Chartres, but she was not too young to be sacrificed to the mature and complaisant cousin of the Emperor. Thus recommended by his alliance with an Italian princess, and as the relative of the Liberator of Italy, Prince Napoleon was despatched to Florence to head the Tuscan levies. The throne of Tuscany was vacant: why should not the grateful Tuscans elect the Prince as their King?

Events, however, did not run smoothly for the Imperial designs. Prince Napoleon was not received with the expected degree of enthusiasm at Florence, and the current of events in other quarters was equally unsatisfactory to the Imperial mind. "Be soldiers to-day," said the Emperor

at Milan, "in order that to-morrow you may be free citizens." The Italians responded with a zeal and unanimity that outran the Imperial desire. Abandoned by the Austrians, the Romagna threw off the Papal sway,—as Rome also would have done but for the continued presence of the French. And each State, as it asserted its freedom, pronounced for annexation with Sardinia. Parma, Modena, Tuscany, the Romagna, joined with Lombardy in proclaiming Victor Emmanuel their King. Prince Napoleon was without a throne,—Sardinia was becoming a kingdom sufficiently powerful to be independent. What was to be done?

It was no part of Napoleon's programme to render Italy independent of France. It was simply to supplant the sway of Austria by the influence of the Tuileries. Therefore he resolved to cut short the war. Three days before Solferino he proposed peace. And immediately after that battle, he sent the autograph letter to his Imperial adversary which led to the conference at Villafranca. The hostility of Germany, the strength of the Quadrilateral—he must have foreseen the

one and known the other. But he had no desire to see Italy escape from his leading-strings. Therefore he abruptly concluded a peace by which the deposed Princes were to be replaced, and Austria left in possession of Venetia. Lombardy was handed over by Francis Joseph to Napoleon III., who in turn made a present of it to Victor Emmanuel: but in what condition was the gift when thus presented? It was a garden without a wall,—a territory without a frontier. Or, still more exactly, it was a garden bounded by a wall and gateways which belonged to another and unfriendly proprietor. "The union of Lombardy to Piedmont," said the Emperor in his exulting address to his army, "creates *for us* on this side of the Alps a powerful ally, who *will owe to us his independence.*" The Liberator of Italy constituted himself its dictator. Kossuth, having served his purpose as a bugbear to frighten Austria, was dismissed,—Count Cavour was forced to resign. The demand for reforms in the Papal States, which Napoleon made the pretext for his quarrel with Austria, he now dropped, and supported the Papal Government by the continued

presence of his army at Rome. He annulled the liberties of the Central States, which had made themselves free; and he decreed that Italy should be thrown back into a dissevered confederation, with Austria menacing her from the Quadrilateral, and France as an imperious protector looking down in compact strength from the passes of the Alps.

Such was the peace of Villafranca which closed the war. It revealed the truth that Napoleon engaged in the war not for the sake of Italy, but for his own,—to consolidate his own position, and to aggrandize the territories and external influence of France at the expense of the country he professed to liberate. He constituted himself the Dictator of Italy, and purposed to keep it dependent upon him as its protector. So ended the first scene in the Italian Act of the New Revolution.

NOTE.

In the beginning of last year the writer did not hesitate to predict that Napoleon was bent upon a war in Italy,—exposed the necessity which urged, and the objects which enticed him on,—and sketched the probable course of the war in a manner which events realized to the letter. In an article in *Blackwood's Magazine*, entitled "Napoleon III. and Europe," the writer observed :—

"Napoleon III. will aim at making this war a short one; and it will also be one of the first requisites in his eyes that it be not allowed to overpass the limits of Italy, and assume a European character, giving rise to unforeseeable conjunctures. He must wish it to be an Italian war confined to Italy; and he will seek to insure this by a previous understanding with Russia, the influence of which great Power, exerted in unison with the objects of France, will wholly neutralize the influence of Great Britain and Prussia on the other side. . . Russia's true policy is to strip Austria of territory to such an extent as to make her unable any longer to match herself against Russia, and willing to recover her strength by joining in the spoliation of Turkey.

"This war with Austria Napoleon regards as a neat little enterprise which can be carried on while the rest of Europe is at peace; and now is the time when it may be executed most successfully. *Now*, when Russia is willing to see Austria weakened, and when none of the other Powers can well interfere, is the time for the French Emperor to win brilliant renown for himself as the 'Liberator of Italy,' and also to gain a powerful position in the Italian peninsula, such as may be turned to good account in the farther and grander strife that is likely to ensue when the Ottoman empire falls to pieces, and the Powers of Christendom quarrel as to the distribution of the spoil.

"It is a war *forced on* by France and Sardinia. A Necessity urges on both of the aggressive Powers. Sardinia, by persisting in keeping up an excessive military establishment, has all but strangled herself with debt, and seeks to free herself by rushing to war and acquiring the rich provinces of Lombardy and Venice. Napoleon III. is a military despot at home, and, by engaging in this Italian war, he calculates alike upon aggrandising the power of France, and upon obviating the outburst of that smouldering revolution which,

were it again to leap forth, would probably engage the French as well as other peoples in a struggle against their despotic Governments.

"Napoleon III. is waiting for the melting of the snows on Mont Cenis,—he may be waiting also for the melting of the ice in the Baltic. . . . In addition to the popular movement throughout Italy by which his enterprise would be seconded, there is available to him a strategetical operation which was never in the power of his uncle. During the wars of the first Revolution, the seas were wholly in possession of the British fleets, and Napoleon I. had to confine his strategy entirely to the land; whereas now (England standing neutral) Napoleon III. may transport his legions to any part of the Italian coast. And if the immense fleet and flotilla of war which he is preparing be able to effect the landing of an army at the head of the Adriatic, such a manœuvre would take in rear all the formidable fortresses and river-lines of Lombardy, and, if successful, would cause the Austrian forces to evacuate the entire valley of the Po and retire to the Passes of the Alps.

"Napoleon III. will not seek to push Austria to extremities (his policy is never to push any power to extremities); and Sardinia and the Italians may rely upon it that he will stop short in the enterprise whenever it suits himself, and compel them also to do the same. Just as he refused to go along with England and Turkey in the war with Russia, after the French arms had been 'covered with glory' by the capture of Sebastopol, so assuredly will the Italians find him resolved to stop short in the 'liberation of Italy' as soon as he thinks best for himself. Triumphs by short wars and diplomacy are the means upon which he relies to aggrandise himself."—*March* 1859.

Writing in May, three weeks before the advance of the French and battle of Magenta, the present writer thus predicted the

course and close of the war :—"The only hope of Austria is in her fortresses, and the tide of war will probably linger long around the fortifications of Mantua and Verona. But, routed in the field, and alarmed at the menacing attitude of Russia in her rear, and at the spread of Russian intrigue through her Slavonic provinces, Austria (unless Germany come to her aid) may be expected not to prolong the contest to extremities. This is precisely what the French Emperor wants and calculates upon, and he will be quite willing to listen to terms in his hour of triumph. Not unlikely, he will even be the first to propose them. Let him once achieve a decisive success, and appear as the triumphant champion of Italian liberty, and he will make little difficulty as to the terms of peace. And Sardinia, and the Italians generally, will be very little consulted in the matter. Their great champion, while affecting the greatest consideration for them, will take his own way, and close the war as quickly as possible. . . . Napoleon III. will repeat the *rôle* which he played so astutely at the close of the war with Russia ; and, assuming the position of mediator between Austria and the Italians, and compelling the latter to accept less than they demand, will show himself so conciliatory to the Court of Vienna as to induce it the more readily to fall in with his plans and Russia's in regard to ulterior operations."—*Blackwood*, June 1859.

Again, in July, when Lord John Russell was insultingly rebutting the apprehensions of the Prussian Government, by appealing to the Milan manifesto as a proof "that in this war the Emperor seeks neither conquest nor territorial aggrandisement," we saw good reason to think differently, and wrote as follows :—"Moderate as Napoleon III. professes to be, and makes a show of being, at present as regards this Italian war, Europe will be far wrong if it believes his version of matters. France has given Lombardy to Sardinia,

and Napoleon III. will have taken a bond over Savoy,—or perhaps over the island of Sardinia—the latter an acquisition which Italy would not grudge, and which, standing alongside of Corsica, would greatly augment the power of France in the Mediterranean. Of all this Europe will at present hear nothing. The bond will only transpire when a convenient season has come for acting upon it. Meanwhile Napoleon III. will continue to proclaim to Europe his extreme moderation, and his desire to be on good terms with every one—knowing this to be the best means for gradually working his way to the goal of his ambition."—*Blackwood*, August 1859.

V.

March 24.

THE Palmerston Cabinet have at length been startled by the daring ambition of their Imperial "ally." Quietly but resolutely, and as a matter of course, Napoleon sets the Powers and treaties of Europe at defiance, and proceeds with the annexation of Savoy and Nice,—advancing the frontiers of France to the crest of the Italian Alps and along the shores of the Lake of Geneva. He has given a new proof that professions are but the counters with which he plays his game. When opposition was made in the British Parliament to the treaty of "commerce and amity," he announced that he had abandoned his project of annexation. Next he assured the British Government that he would not proceed with it unless he obtained the consent of the European Powers. Again, he promised that the wishes of the Savoyards should first be consulted by universal suffrage. Each of these pledges has in succession been given to the winds. He promised, moreover, both to the English and Swiss Ministers at

Paris, that, in any event, a good military frontier should be secured to Switzerland. This promise, too, has been broken. Not even the neutrality of Switzerland is now to be respected. The districts neutralized by the solemn treaty of 1815 are to be incorporated with France, and by the destruction of their natural frontiers, Switzerland and Italy alike are to be placed at the mercy of the vast military power of Napoleon. The English Cabinet are discovering how misplaced has been their confidence in their Imperial ally. The moment he had snared them by the ratification of the Treaty, he broached his purpose of annexing the Sardinian provinces; and no sooner has the treaty been accepted by the British Parliament, than he drops his various disguises, and announces to Europe that the complete annexation of those provinces is "necessary" to France.

Events have progressed rapidly since we began this series of articles. What was unthought of or discredited five weeks ago is becoming visible as a fact to the eyes of all. The Napoleonic policy is again on the move. The curtain has risen on another stage of the Imperial

ideas. Europe begins to awake to a sense of the impending danger,—but slowly, hesitatingly, timidly. The French Emperor has taken and keeps the initiative; and no State has the courage to oppose him. He stands boldly on a vantage-ground, and all eyes turn with misgivings to the future. What will it bring?

Napoleon III. is as much a Man of Destiny as his Uncle; and people ponder his former writings and now republished works, as if these were Sybilline books prophetic of what is coming. In this they are partly right and partly wrong. A discerning eye can discover in these books the central ideas of the Imperial policy, but no clue is furnished to its external modifications. In the present Emperor's essay on the foreign policy of his Uncle, he says:—"After Napoleon arrived at power, it was indispensable that he should have a *general object* in view; but his views were constantly modified, extended, or contracted according to the march of events. He said, 'I was not guilty of the folly of desiring to bend events to suit my system; but on the contrary, I bent my system so as to adapt it to events.'" Louis

Napoleon adopts the same principle. His tactics vary from day to day; but he too has a system—a "general object"—as Europe will find ere long.

"In the case of a free people," said he in his essay on the policy of the later Stuarts, "there never has been a government sufficiently powerful long to repress liberty at home without giving it glory abroad." This maxim, we presume it will be admitted, Napoleon III. has already acted upon,—seeking to divert the thoughts of his subjects from his tyranny at home by his triumphs abroad. And in his *Idées Napoléoniennes*, while repeating the maxim, he indicates also the manner in which it ought to be applied. "France! France of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., of Carnot, of Napoleon—always the fountain of progress for western Europe—has France no longer a mission to fulfil? Will she exhaust her resources and energies in never-ending internal suicidal contests? No! such cannot be the destiny of France! Soon will come the day when, in order to reign over her, it will be understood that her part is, to cast into the scale of all treaties her sword of Brennus on the side of civilization!" Has not

the recent policy of Louis Napoleon been a practical embodiment of this idea? Is he not shearing away "all treaties" with the sword of Brennus? —and is it not as the champion of "civilization" that he is becoming the military arbiter and despot of Europe?

"I represent a principle, a cause, and a defeat." The cause he has made triumphant by the re-establishment of a Napoleonic Empire in France. The principle is at work. The revenge is in prospect.

The Principle is "the sovereignty of the people." The idea of revolutionary France in 1792 is the idea also of the New Revolution. It is the lever by which Napoleon III. purposes to upset all the treaties and territorial arrangements of Europe, in order to place France once more at the head of the nations. He resumes the work of the first Revolution. On the 19th November 1792, the Convention issued its memorable decree, proffering "assistance to every people which wishes to recover its liberty;" and two days afterwards it declared that "France will make common cause with all those who desire to shake off

the yoke" of their Governments. And as the first act in consonance with this policy, a Jacobin club was established at Chambery in Savoy, the members of which went forth as emissaries, "armed with the torch of reason and liberty, to enlighten the Savoyards as to their imprescriptible rights." A deputation from Savoy waited upon the Convention, and French troops then entered Savoy and Nice, annexing both provinces as departments of France. What is the difference between then and now? The Rhine provinces and Belgium were next seized,—the Convention justifying its violation of the law of nations by maintaining that "treaties could not bind the free and enfranchised Belgians." This was the principle of French policy in 1792-3. It is also the "principle" of which Louis Napoleon proclaims himself the representative.

It was during the Russian war that Louis Napoleon first ventured, after his elevation to the throne, to broach this formidable principle of revolution. "The eyes of all who suffer," said he in one of his manifestoes, "turn to the West." He had then Poland in his eye, as the Czar will

do well to remember. During the past year, however, Napoleon III. has proclaimed the principle repeatedly and without disguise. In his address to the Chambers on 7th February 1859, he announced that one of the "principles" of his rule was "to *restore* France to her true rank among the nations," and also affirmed that it was not only justifiable but befitting on his part to go to war "for the defence of great national interests" (which in another document were explained as comprising "religion, philosophy, and civilization"); and that "the interest of France is everywhere where there is a just cause, and where civilization is to be *made* to prevail." Likewise, in a Ministerial circular issued a few days afterwards, the prefects were instructed to apprise the journals that the policy of his Imperial Majesty of France "is ready to manifest itself wherever the cause of justice and civilization is to be assisted." What is this but the aggressive principles of revolutionary France in 1792 accommodated to the ear of the present age? And what is the annexation of Savoy and Nice but an exact repetition of the course pursued by the

Convention, and a certain prelude to a similar attack upon the Rhine provinces? What is it, in short, but a warning that Napoleon III. revives the policy of his Uncle, and openly assumes the championship of the New Revolution?

France aspired to the dominion of Europe at the close of the seventeenth century under her Grand Monarque; she began the same game still more formidably at the close of the eighteenth century; and now, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, she manifestly desires to renew that policy of vaulting ambition once more. Each epoch of events bears an impress peculiar to itself: and the new attempt must assume a somewhat different guise from its predecessors. The first attempt was made by an autocrat and an aristocracy; the second was begun by the people in the fever of revolution, and was carried out by an undisguised policy of military conquest. Naked ambition—war for the mere sake of territorial aggrandizement—will not now be tolerated. To be successful, Imperial ambition must mask itself. It must affect a homage, however insincere, to public opinion. And the most dangerous enemy

to the peace of Europe is not simply he who can put the best army in the field, but he who possesses the art of playing upon public opinion, and converting the moral instincts of mankind into a lever for the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

It is thus that Napoleon has acted during the past year. While occasioning the Italian war, and even being the first to begin it, he professed never to have armed,—to be only desirous of a pacific settlement,—and finally, that he commenced hostilities in self-defence. Next, when the war was begun, he proclaimed that he fought only for an "idea," the "liberation of Italy." Upon that plea he appealed to England to support him, and with audacious effrontery, even professed to hold himself aggrieved because we did not join our forces to his. Yet, no sooner did he see that Italy was becoming more free and united than suited the ambition of France, than he cut short the war, and sacrificed a portion of the independence which the Italians had won. Again, when peace was concluded, he tossed aside his fine professions at Milan, by broaching the annexation

of Italian provinces; and by and by it became known that he had actually bargained for Savoy and Nice before ever he consented to join with Sardinia in fastening the quarrel upon Austria! Nor is his Principle, "the sovereignty of the people," any more sacred in his eyes than are his professions. It is a mere mask for his ambition, which he assumes or lets drop as suits his policy for the hour. When Tuscany, by her established Legislature, voted a union with Sardinia, he declared that it did not become a Government like his, founded upon universal suffrage, to recognize any vote but that of the universal population; yet when the population, by universal suffrage, and with a unanimity surpassing that which placed himself upon the French throne, have reaffirmed with enthusiasm their union with Sardinia, he still does all he can to prevent it. Again, when he announced his desire to annex Savoy, he at first proposed to leave the question to be decided by the universal suffrage of the Savoyards. Yet now, with unsurpassable effrontery, he draws back; requires the King of Sardinia to discard the allegiance of the Savoyards, and floods the country

with his agents and troops, before the issue is submitted to their vote. His engagement to consult the Great Powers is equally a mockery. Savoy and Nice are "necessary" to France, and he must have them, let the people vote or the Powers protest as they may! Verily, Napoleon III. makes fools of us all,—of all the States of Europe, of all the "ideas" of humanity!

VI.

March 31.

THE march of events has at length wrung from Lord John Russell the confession that the British Government has been deceived and overreached; and that, in order to guard against fresh attacks by Napoleon upon the treaties of Europe, it is indispensable for England to draw closer her relations with the other Powers of Europe. Better late than never. He now adopts views long ago proclaimed by "THE PRESS." But the Ministry will find that their previous policy has gone far to render their repentance unavailing.

The policy of Napoleon III. is too subtle and too powerful to be watched with indifference. The events of the last twelvemonth, however inadequately they have yet been appreciated, at least teach us this. Statesmanship needs its keenest gaze to penetrate the darkness in which Napoleon shrouds his designs, and the masks under which he prosecutes them; and an unsleeping vigilance can alone suffice to follow him in the windings and doublings by which he

approaches his goal. That goal—the despotic ascendancy of France—may be approached by various ways, and he tries now one, now another, as for the time he finds most practicable. Gifted with a prescient power of calculation, he covers the map of the Future with his plans, and steadily and unflinchingly he works onwards towards the accomplishment of each in its turn—ever thinking of the others while carrying out the one in hand, so as to make each pave the way for its successor. Sagacious and circumspect, when the tide of events runs strongly against any of his projects, he lets it drop—replacing it by another, or only postponing it till a more convenient season. He bides his time; and his marvellous reticence and self-control veil even from his own Ministers the ends of his far-reaching policy. The acts or shifts of that policy appear one by one, but the plan of which they are fragments he keeps to himself.

Napoleon never engages in any line of policy without holding himself ready to stop, the moment circumstances make it his interest to do so. No feature of his character has so puzzled onlookers as this. They see him enter warmly into a pro-

ject, then all at once stop in mid-career. From the outset, it may be, he had never intended to go further; or else the flux of circumstances, which one may watch but no one can entirely control, took such a course as showed he could obtain better results by stopping half-way. Witness the war with Russia,—witness also the war in Italy. His tactics are, never to push any Power to extremities; but rather, having gained glory and advantage at its expense, thereafter to secure it as an ally in his designs against some other State. For he must be at war with All—not at once, but if possible with each in turn—before the traditions of the Empire are fulfilled and the New Revolution accomplished.

In exile and adversity, Louis Napoleon had time to reflect upon the politics of Europe and the interests and desires of the French nation, and from these to deduce the leading objects which should shape his policy. His personal susceptibilities we put out of view: he is too great and sagacious to let his policy be influenced by a desire to avenge affronts directed against himself as an individual. But Russia had

beaten his Uncle, and in conjunction with the other Powers had conquered France. The retreat from Moscow and the capture of Paris are memories which will sting as long as they endure. Accordingly, to defeat and humble Russia in turn was a point of ambition both to Napoleon and to the French people. Yet, during the secret negotiations which preceded and the Congress which followed the Crimean contest, he showed every desire to let Russia off easily. Having humbled Russia, it was enough: thenceforth it was his interest to obtain her friendship as a means of carrying out other schemes which he had in reserve, and in which his then ally England was not likely to support him. An Italian war was already in his mind; and in Russia he sought and found an ally who, for the sake of humbling "ungrateful" Austria, would be content to tolerate a partial infringement of the treaties of 1815.

Austria accordingly was the second of his Uncle's foes whom he fixed in the cleft stick of his subtle policy. At the outset of his career, Austria and he were on good terms; and in the summer of 1853, when we were drifting into the

Russian war, there was issued at Paris a "Revised Map of Europe," embodying Napoleon I.'s project of checking the advance of Russia upon Constantinople by giving the Danubian provinces to Austria—thereby interjecting a great military Power between the northern Colossus and its prey. Probably Louis Napoleon at first entertained this plan—a plan which, besides securing to Germany its natural outlet by the Danube, had many advantages as respects the general balance of power in Europe. And doubtless if Austria had been willing to make room for France in Italy by resigning Lombardy in exchange for the Danubian provinces, it was a project which Napoleon III. would have supported. But the French Emperor had not then attained to his present power; and Austria showed no desire to give up her old provinces in Italy for the sake of new possessions, which would be unceasingly contested by Russia, in the valley of the Danube. Moreover, the neutrality maintained by Austria prevented the anti-Russian Alliance assuming such a magnitude as would have induced Russia to submit to so great a revision of the boundaries of

eastern Europe. To have checked the Muscovite advance upon Turkey, by the same plan that would have opened Italy to France, would probably have been the best arrangement for the French Emperor. But Napoleon has many strings to his bow; and when this one failed, he coolly and deliberately took the opposite course of propitiating Russia in order that he might assail Austria. No one knows the exact nature of the "secret agreement" which, as Prince Gortschakoff admitted, was concluded a year ago between France and Russia in prospect of the Italian war; but the overt acts of the Russian Government prove that that Power was ready to cover the Italian intervention of France by menacing any Power which should dare to interpose. When Germany murmured and armed, Prince Gortschakoff threatened her with an attack on the Vistula; and if England had wished to depart from her neutrality, the combined fleets of France and Russia, then far superior in number to our own, were doubtless reckoned upon to keep the haughty Islanders in check.

Covered by the ægis of Russia, Napoleon suc-

cessfully executed his attack upon Austria and his first infringement of the treaties of 1815. Another of his Uncle's foes was humbled. Who is to be the next?

The Czar may yet rue the day when he supported the French Emperor in his first attack upon the treaties and territorial settlement of Europe. In so doing, he forgot the lessons of the past. Half a century ago there was a previous Alexander and a previous Napoleon who met on the raft at Tilsit, and concocted an imperial scheme of ambition by which they were to isolate England and dispose of the fortunes of Europe. But after a fascinated dream of four years the Alexander of those days began to see that he was the dupe of his Imperial ally; and after a similar interval the present Alexander apparently begins to entertain a like apprehension. What were the overtures which induced the Russian Government to become the trusting friend of Napoleon III. can only be conjectured. But it may reasonably be inferred that the weakening of Austria as a means of facilitating another Russian intervention in Turkey formed part of the programme. Austria

was to lose Lombardy in order that she might the more readily join in a fresh attack upon the Ottoman empire, by which she might compensate her losses in Italy by acquiring the north-western provinces of Turkey; and the Czar agreed to lend his support to the French intervention in Italy, on the understanding that France in turn should keep England in check when the Muscovite power was again let loose against the territories of the Porte. It seemed a fair bargain—a promising policy. England was to be excluded from the affairs of Europe, while France and Russia took their own way. Napoleon—repeating the game which he had played so successfully with regard to the Crimean contest—closed the Italian war so adroitly that he won the goodwill of his antagonist, after having bred dissension between Austria and her old ally England. Indeed the irritation against England was then so prevalent not only in Austria but over all Germany, that, strong in the friendship of Russia, Napoleon seemed not unwilling to court an open rupture with this country. Spain was excited to a war with Morocco, which could in a moment be con-

verted into an attack upon Gibraltar; the Suez Canal scheme was openly and energetically supported against us by the French Government; and the thunders of the French press were launched against England in more rancorous and sneering hostility than even at the time of the Orsini plot. But by and by a change came. The French press, obedient to the Imperial will, became as silent as erst it had been vociferous. And other signs of a shifting of the Imperial tactics followed. What was the cause? It was a threatened collapse of the fabric of Alliances which the masterly art of Napoleon had reared for himself on the Continent.

Russia began to take alarm at the revolutionary policy of the French Emperor. Napoleon's project for using Kossuth as an agent for exciting a revolutionary movement in Hungary was the first event which cooled the cordial understanding between the Czar and the Emperor; and Napoleon's repeated declarations, in language which hardly veiled the sentiment, that he held himself ready to intervene on behalf of any people that considered themselves oppressed, began to sound

ominously to the Court of St. Petersburg. That principle applied to Poland as well as to Hungary —it might be applied also to Ireland and the Ionian Islands. Elated by his military triumphs, Napoleon III. was going too fast. Alexander III. began to awake from his dream. The Imperial Nephews cooled, as the Imperial Uncles quarrelled. Austria, too, had begun to regard with distaste the Potentate who refused to fulfil his engagements at Villafranca.

Such was the altered aspect of affairs at the close of the year. Ever vigilant, Napoleon instantaneously shifted his sails and tried a new tack. It was by a skilful wooing of alliances that he had raised himself to his dominating position in Europe, and he had no desire to fall back into a condition of isolation. Since Russia, Prussia, and Austria showed symptoms of growing shy of him, he resolved, with that promptitude which marks his policy, to find a counterpoise in a closer alliance with England. England, so recently the taunted and despised, was once more to be made the sheet-anchor of his policy. Not that he abandoned the hope of re-establishing his under-

standing with Russia and Austria; but he knew that he should best succeed in doing so by showing that he had another basis of power. Hence his sudden dismissal of Walewski,—hence his recall of De Thouvenel, the vehement supporter of the Suez Canal, from Constantinople,—and hence, above all, his treaty of commerce and amity with this country. It was indispensable to his prestige to obtain the countenance of England; and the treaty was a diplomatic stroke by which to purchase back the goodwill of the offended "nation of shopkeepers." It was an overt display of amity between the two Powers, designed to uphold his prestige until he could achieve a further development of the Napoleonic ideas. The bait was swallowed—too eagerly to permit of reflection.

So commenced the present year 1860,—a year destined to be more memorable in the history of Europe than any since the peace of 1815.

VII.

April 14.

HAVING traversed the past—having followed the career of Louis Napoleon, and analysed his policy up to the present hour, it remains for us to cast a glance towards the future. As to the general bent of the Napoleonic policy in the future, there can be little hesitation. The gradual aggrandizement of France at the expense of the other States, and perpetually recurring wars and spoliation, masked by the most solemn professions of disinterestedness and peace,—such is the general programme. Neither need we hesitate to specify as the already marked objects of his ambition, all the Rhine provinces from the Palatinate to the sea, including Antwerp which would become a grander Cherbourg, and also the Channel Islands which at present own the sway of England.

This would round his frontiers at home, but it would not replace France in that dominant position which he aspires to obtain for her. Louis Napoleon does not forget that France under her old monarchy had a magnificent colonial empire,

which was totally swept away by the power of England during the wars of the Revolution and the Empire. He aspires to revive that colonial empire, partly by "reclaiming" portions of it, and partly by making new settlements, such as those which he seeks to establish in Siam and on the southern coast of the Red Sea. In Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, there is at present a French population amounting to about a million, who, though they have been British subjects for eighty years, still preserve a distinct nationality. Louis Napoleon has had his eye upon that population. So early as 1852, he sought to develop the French fisheries and trade there by high bounties, which made every one awake to his nationality, by showing that it was better to be a subject of France than of England. And ever since the close of the Crimean war, the French Government has been carrying matters in that quarter with a high hand,—pushing their rights to the utmost letter of the law, and even beyond the law, in so resolute a spirit, that our Colonial Ministers have hitherto thought it better to give way than come to a rupture. At this

moment, in defiance of treaties, the French have fortified an island lying at the very entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence; and around that as a rallying-point they have forty thousand French fishermen organized as parts of a regular service. Here is one "Idea" for the future. Napoleon already has it in his eye. It will not do to make many enemies by showing all his schemes at once, but he will get all things ready, so that, when a fit time comes, an outburst of nationality among the French Canadians may at once embarrass England, and justify the sword of Brennus in assuming the championship of liberty and civilization on the shores of the St. Lawrence. If he cannot regain those possessions for France, he will at least employ them as a distracting element in his contest with this country, so as to induce the British Government the more readily to come to terms.*

But it is in Europe itself that the full disturb-

* It is now announced that Prince Napoleon is about to visit Canada,—probably with a view to neutralise in some degree the presence of the Prince of Wales among the French population, and suggest to them hopes of future independence from the yoke of England—(*May* 22).

ing force of the Napoleonic ideas will be felt. Italy, Poland, and Hungary were three weak points of the European system which he could turn to account. He has already made partial use of the first; the two others will be played with in due time. They are petards in reserve, useful for causing explosions in Russia and Austria, should these Powers form a league against France. The Schleswig-Holstein question is another which he can intermeddle with; and although his principle of "national rights" should lead him to support Germany in reclaiming those provinces, yet at present—for the sake of embarrassing Prussia, and in the hope of obtaining the aid of the Danish fleet in any war with England—he is taking an entirely opposite course.

It may appear an extraordinary statement to make, yet we believe that Napoleon thinks he will be able to reconcile Europe to the large additions which he proposes to make to France, by recasting the territorial arrangements in such a manner that each of the Powers which has to cede territory to France will be made a gainer in some other way. We have seen how he has

done this in the case of Italy. We hear how he is now attempting it in the case of the Palatinate, coolly proposing that Bavaria should be recompensed by acquiring territory from her neighbours. He is strongly bent upon establishing a Napoleonic dynasty in Italy; and doubtless King Victor Emmanuel would be as pleased as himself to see Prince Napoleon and his Sardinian consort placed on the throne of Southern Italy. We cannot look upon the aspect of affairs in Italy without believing that the announced withdrawal of the French troops from Rome is a sign that the French Emperor has resolved to let the war burst out anew, in order that he may find in Naples that throne for his cousin which he sought for in vain at Florence.

Napoleon does not hope to gain the frontier of the Rhine without a struggle. There must be more war and more unsettling of the limits of empires before he can be in a position to find for Prussia and Bavaria those new provinces which are to compensate them for those coveted by France. Hence, the sword cannot rest long in its scabbard. There must be war in Germany before the Germans will submit to be cast back to the

east of the Rhine. Germany, even though sadly disunited, is a formidable adversary; and Napoleon knows that he must not only increase those internal dissensions, but also that he must secure the neutrality of Russia and Austria. With Russia this may be done easily; with Austria, herself a member of the Confederation, the matter will be more difficult. In fact, to France, as to Russia, Austria presents herself in two distinct phases,—either as an empire which cannot stand, and therefore may profitably be knocked to pieces and her provinces given in compensation to other States; or as a Power desirable to uphold, but which it is necessary to eliminate from Germany and transfer further to the east.

It may seem remarkable that neither Russia nor Austria has of late showed any desire to maintain treaties and prevent the seizure by France of Savoy and Nice. But there is a great bait by which their silence has been secured. It is the bait which ever since 1856 has made Russia the friend of France. The bait is TURKEY. This is the bank of deposit by unlimited drafts upon which Napoleon counts to reconcile all parties to

his game. Russia will let France have the frontier of the Alps and the Rhine, because she is to be allowed to make a still more extensive addition to her own territories at the expense of Turkey. Austria may even be reconciled to the loss of other provinces from the expectation of new possessions in the same quarter. And with Austria driven eastward, and Germany consolidated, Prussia, at last raised to the headship of the Germanic race, may be induced to conclude a peace which will make everything French up to the line of the Rhine.

Such, we conjecture, is the general plan of policy which Napoleon has traced out for himself. Whether he will succeed in working it out to a successful close is far beyond our powers to predict. It is easy to see that if France combine with Russia and Austria in assailing the Ottoman empire, it is not in the power of England singly, or conjointly with Prussia, to check the design. But, indeed, why should Prussia desire to interfere in such a question? She may justly say, "It does not much concern me who reigns at Constantinople; and besides, as a fellow State of

Germany, it ought rather to please me to see Austria repair her losses in Italy by new provinces in Turkey." This is probably the answer we should get if we were to ask Prussia to join us in defending the domains of the Porte: coupled perhaps with a stinging allusion to our own conduct when asked for support by Prussia during the Italian war. When, justly alarmed at the new phase of Napoleon's policy, Prussia appealed to our Government last summer for assurances of friendship and support, Lord J. Russell thought it sufficient to quote the Milan manifesto of the Emperor to show that there was not the slightest danger to be apprehended, and with never-to-be-forgotten flippancy asked Baron Schleinitz, "if Germany would be any safer because Parma and Modena were ill-governed!" When the Eastern question is reopened—as assuredly it will be soon —Lord John Russell may knock in vain for aid at the council-doors of Berlin. "When we told you," Baron Schleinitz may then say, "that Napoleon was bent upon attacking Europe in detail, you treated the idea with scorn, and openly wished that the Gallic eagles might completely expel the

Austrians from Italy: yet now you would have us join you against Napoleon when he is actually compensating our sister State for the losses which he then inflicted, and which you rejoiced in. Besides, O trusting philanthropist! do you not see that the manifestoes of his Majesty breathe the noblest of sentiments; and can you imagine that England will be any safer because the population of Turkey is badly governed under the régime of the Porte."

Such probable recriminations and alienations between England and Prussia constitute the gravest peril that lies ahead. Napoleon has already gained Russia by the bait of Turkey, and he may gain Austria likewise should he find it more advantageous to conciliate that power than to destroy her. A severance of England and Prussia would complete his game, and enable him to bring each of these Powers to his terms in turn. It seems to us that the policy best calculated to do this is the reopening of the Eastern question,—Russia and Austria invading Turkey, while France plays the part of a covering friend by keeping off England. England would as-

suredly in such circumstances apply for support to Prussia, and Prussia, acting upon our own principles, would reply that she was not concerned in the matter. Russia and Austria being thus satisfied, and engaged in reorganizing their new possessions, France in turn would assume the initiative and reopen the question of the Rhine. Popular movements in favour of annexation to France would be got up in Belgium and Rhenish Prussia, and Napoleon, as the champion of civilization, would "reclaim" those provinces from Germany. Thus menaced, Germany would appeal for support to England, and England, soured by the neutrality of Prussia in the Eastern question, would probably reply that she did not feel called upon to interfere. Prussia, with the approval of France, would then take possession of the kingdom of Hanover, in compensation for the Rhine provinces: and the breach between England and Prussia would thus be widened to the utmost.

Then, at last, would come the attack upon England. Her grand supremacy upon the seas is, to French eyes, a hateful despotism that must be pulled down. What right has England to cover

the highway of the seas with her fortified posts? Why should she hold Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, Perim, and Aden? This also is a crime against that "civilization" of which the sword of Brennus so generously assumes the championship. And it will be a demand for the cession of some of those maritime strongholds that will constitute the object of the war. Nor will poor Ireland escape being made the tool of our Imperial foe. By that time, most probably, he will again have made friends with the Pope; and there is at all times a mass of discontent in Ireland ready to fraternize with invading Frenchmen. Little more than a year ago, the most common and eager question heard in some districts of western Ireland was, "When are the French coming?" And, as is known to the law officers of the late Government, in the investigations into the Phœnix Club conspiracy, proof was got of the operations of a person who was traced from place to place but finally escaped, and as to whom the evidence left hardly a shadow of a doubt that he was a French emissary. Napoleon III. looks about for every means of attack, and uses it unscrupulously.

As his Uncle used the Poles against Russia, and then abandoned them—as he himself wished to use Kossuth and the Hungarians against Austria, so will he seek, when the time comes, to make tools of the Irish and of the Canadian French, and yet sacrifice them in a moment should it suit his interests to do so.

VIII.

April 14.

"ROME," said Montesquieu, "became great because her wars with other nations were successive; each nation, by an inconceivable good fortune, attacking her only after another had been vanquished." Louis Napoleon, in his "*Ideas*," quotes this sentence, and adds: "That which chance and fortune did for the aggrandizement of Rome, Napoleon procured for France by his policy." By courting the friendship of all the Powers, and only breaking with one at a time, he says, France obtains the assurance that there will be "no universal war," and for France "no dishonourable peace." It was a universal war—an uprising of suffering Europe against the common foe that at length brought the first Napoleon to the ground, and banished him amidst the exulting joy even of his own subjects from the continent whose peace he had never ceased to disturb. By Louis Napoleon, accordingly, there is no event which is so greatly dreaded as a general war. For, once a nation's blood is up,

the subtle casuistries of diplomacy go for nought —the most ingenious of State-manifestoes fall powerless against the aroused common sense of mankind—and the most elaborate professions of morality are dismissed with scorn when emanating from a Ruler whose conduct has proved that he regards such professions merely as the counters with which he plays his game of ambition.

Never before did Imperial ambition mask itself so carefully under the guise of morality. We live in an age when Public Opinion is a power of the first magnitude. And, unsurpassed either in audacity or astuteness, Louis Napoleon seeks to perplex and overwhelm public opinion by appealing to it for support in the very policy which is designed to outrage it. His professions vary every hour—but every hour they are moral. Never did a Ruler employ moral professions in a manner more unblushingly immoral. Indeed he has now taken for his Foreign Minister a diplomatist whose chief distinction is his ability to write despatches which make the worse to appear the better reason. By the pen of De Thouvenel, evil is made to appear good, and good evil. He

can put the required gloss upon everything. A Belial or Ahitophel of the pen, the Imperial despatch-writer does such smooth homage to the Eternal Verities that people are slow to believe that the Imperial policy is all a fabric of lies—a whited sepulchre, full of murdered oaths and of rotting masks of morality which have served their day. Louis Napoleon turns everything and every one to account. When the Italian war was approaching, he opened private communications with Kossuth, and, as the first mode of turning him to use, got him to travel up and down England, employing his eloquence to disarm the suspicions of the English public and play upon their sympathies with liberty, in order to induce us to look quietly on while the Emperor began his game of tearing up the treaties of 1815, and drove in the wedge by which he hopes to split up Europe to his liking. An elaborate homage to morality displays itself above a perpetual undercurrent of deceitfulness and intrigue. Nay more, unparalleled in his desire to make a tool of public opinion, Napoleon spares no pains to distort that opinion by Napoleonizing its organs, the news-

papers. We do not speak of the French press, which is simply a hundred-headed monster ever pouring the One Voice through its many mouths. Neither need we go to Italy, Nice, Savoy, Germany, or Belgium, for newspapers bought up or started fresh by agents of the French Government. With grief we say it—we find the same Napoleonising of newspapers carried on in our own country, and in London itself. Three of our old-established metropolitan newspapers now draw their inspiration from Albert-Gate, or from the audience-room of the Emperor's private secretary M. Moquard,—and it is said that yet another of our London journals is being brought under the same anti-national influences. Louis XIV., when attacking the liberties of Europe, purchased the neutrality of England by bribing her Stuart Kings and their Parliament. Suiting his tactics to the altered requirements of the time, Napoleon III. bestows his largesses on journalists and invests his money in newspapers, becoming indirectly the proprietor of some of them, and influencing the tone of others by the bribe of early information.

Such is the Imperial despotism with which England and Europe have now to contend. Its policy walks in darkness, breeding dissension and conspiring against peace; but whenever it comes to the surface, and appears in the light of day, it wears the mask of all the virtues and its mouth speaks moralities. Backed by the most formidable military power in Europe, Napoleon III. nevertheless marches on his way with foot of velvet. It is the very noiselessness of his march, the very mildness of his voice, that he most trusts to. There is no longer the incessant thundering of the cannon as year after year the Grand Monarque broke through the barrier fortresses,—there is no longer the wild declaration of war against everybody poured forth by the Ishmaelites of the Convention,—no longer the ceaseless marching of the first Napoleon's legions from Italy to Austria, from Austria to Prussia, from Prussia to Spain. Instead of these we hear a calm measured voice which speaks everlastingly of friendship, peace, and civilization, even when on the very eve of a war which it has secretly prepared for and resolutely forced on. Sudden and short wars—

leaps of the stealthy-footed tiger—is his policy of attack. He can fight, and fight well; but he never appeals to arms until he has beforehand secured the victory by the profound combinations of his diplomacy. Whenever he assails a State, depend upon it he has previously estranged its allies and undermined its defences. He never attacks until his diplomacy has prepared masked batteries sufficient to make his adversary's position untenable. This is the art of war as practised by Napoleon the Third.

Hitherto he has been entirely successful. Europe stands before him dismayed and paralyzed. He makes war where he will, and no Power dares to intervene between him and his victim. He seizes what provinces he desires, annuls whatever treaties stand in his way, and not a single great Power dares offend him by even lodging a protest. He is the Lord-Paramount of Europe, and in the very heart of the world's civilization this single man assumes like a Providence to dispense peace and war to the nations.

How long will it last? How will it end? A time of mighty changes and trouble is coming

upon Europe. Europe is being placed bit by bit in the crucible: it remains to be seen whether, however wary the Imperial experimenter, it will not yet slip through his fingers and blaze in one common conflagration. High as Napoleon at present stands, Providence seldom permits a career like his to close in peace and honour. We rather think of Macbeth at bay in his Castle of Dunsinane—sighing for the "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends" that age should bring, yet forced to stand desperately at bay against not only his enemies but the disaffection of his own subjects.

"I swear before God to uphold the Republic" (1849)—"the Empire is peace" (1852)—"France has not armed" (1859)—"I have always respected recognized rights" (1860). We now know what relation the language of Napoleon bears to common truth. "Qui ne sait pas dissimuler ne sait pas regner" is as much his maxim as it was that of Louis IX. But the mighty prestige of personal character is departing from him, and as it ebbs he must rely more upon the sword. Year by year we shall see more of the sword, and hear less of

the moralities. Let England stand upon her guard, and prepare for a contest which may not approach her with all the sound and thunder of the first Napoleon's attack, but which will not fail to be more deadly in its onset. It is not the sounding sweep of the broadsword we have to encounter, but the sudden thrust of the rapier. "All our wars have come from England," says Louis Napoleon. "I represent a defeat, and the defeat is Waterloo!" It remains for England to show if she is still a match for the Corsican,—or if she who withstood the worst fury of the Uncle will succumb to the subtler attack of the Nephew, and the defeat of Waterloo be avenged at our expense.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

ENGLAND IN THE CRISIS.

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ENGLAND IN THE CRISIS.

I.

May 26.

EUROPE is not long to have peace. One war is past, and lo! another and greater is at hand. The clouds have gathered again after the Rains. Storms are brewing in the political horizon of Europe, and the troubles which are approaching threaten to be of a most serious kind. The expedition of Garibaldi is rekindling the flames of war in the Italian peninsula; and Russia, in concert with France, is about to re-open the Eastern Question.

The new struggle in Italy cannot fail to prove a source of grave embarrassment to the European Powers. In England, this new contest, waged by the Italians themselves, will be universally regarded with more favour than the former one, which was forced on by the French Emperor, and

waged with a view to the special interests of France. Garibaldi has long been the *bête noir* of the French Government; and the new conflict in which he has engaged threatens to be a very embarrassing one to Napoleon III. It is a popular movement—it is the effort of a people to be free,—and his own people are not free. If the Romans or Neapolitans rise in revolt, it were more than the Emperor's throne is worth to order his troops to act against them. He may support the Papal Government within the walls of Rome, where the circumvallation may suffice to draw a clear line between his troops and those of the national party. But dare he do more?—and even in these circumstances would there not be a risk of the French *braves* fraternizing with the popular side? It must now be a serious question with the Emperor, therefore, whether to withdraw his army from Rome and abnegate his championship of the Church, or permit his troops to remain in defence of the Papacy and encounter the risk of fraternizing with the Italians.

The expedition of Garibaldi will probably act as an interruption to the Imperial plans, and pro-

cure for Turkey a brief respite from the assault of her foes. It is an event which may produce the gravest consequences. It may occasion a rupture between France and Austria, or, at the eleventh hour, it may scare Russia in her projects of aggression, by the uprising of popular movements. But in the affairs of the world, as Louis Napoleon says, "victory in the end belongs to *les phlegmatiques intelligents*," of which he himself is the finest type; and it will be a very obstinate train of circumstances indeed which he will not succeed in turning to account. Unquestionably, unless the development of the revolutionary spirit produce some crisis of unexpected magnitude, the re-opening of the Eastern Question will not be delayed,—and it will be carried out in a manner more menacing to the interests of England than has yet been witnessed. The interview between the Emperors of France and Russia at Stutgardt in 1857, is about to produce its culminating results; and the co-operation of these two Powers, if not suddenly interrupted, may be expected to affect the equilibrium of Europe both upon the Rhine and the Bosphorus. When disaffection is

so widely spread throughout the Turkish provinces, the amount of military pressure from without will not (so far as Turkey is concerned), require to be great. Meanwhile preliminary movements are taking place. Prince Gortschakoff has announced to the assembled Ministers of the European Courts at St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government is resolved to renew its intervention in Turkey on behalf of the Greek Christians. And Count Lavalette, the fiery ambassador of France, who created the imbroglio at Constantinople in 1852, has been re-commissioned to his old post. Dissensions of a serious kind exist between the Turkish Government and Servia; and the prevalent feeling in all the northern provinces of the Porte is of such a nature as to admit of being easily fanned into revolt. With a view to what is impending, Russia is assembling an army in Poland, all the frontier fortresses are being put in repair, and two *corps-d'armée* are concentrating close to the boundary-stream of the Pruth; while in Asia, from her advanced posts on the Oxus and Caspian, she is watching the feud at present going on between the chiefs of Bok-

hara and the old Ameer of Cabool. When the attack commences upon Turkey, the Russian Government will not fail to perceive that it is its interest to distract the forces of England by creating an embarrassment for us in the East. *

* At the close of an article on "Foreign Affairs," written in August last, the present writer remarked :—"The next chapter of the Napoleonic policy will open in Turkey. Long before the Italian war began, we not only pointed out that it was coming, but, while showing beforehand the objects which Napoleon sought to accomplish by the war, we stated that one of these was, to secure the future co-operation of Austria, by holding out to her the prospect of compensating her losses in Italy by gains in Turkey. When this new chapter of Napoleonism opens—and it will not be long delayed—France will then do for Russia what Russia, during the late war, has done for her. France, if things go smoothly, will take no direct part in the war. Her task will simply be to prevent England from interfering. And Russia, by pushing forward a corps toward Herat, will be ready (in the event of our contumacy) to occasion fresh uneasiness in our Indian empire, with a view to prevent our drawing any material reinforcements from that quarter. In these circumstances, what is the choice presented to us? We may, if we choose, continue the system of passive neutrality,—we may see a Russian army at Constantinople, as we have seen, and yet see, a French army in Italy ; and we may still hug ourselves in the belief that we are astonishing the world by an exhibition of all the utilitarian virtues. But that will soon have had its day. France and Russia are both bent upon becoming great naval powers in the Mediterranean ; and although Napoleon III. well knows the usefulness of moderation, and ever

The intelligence from the Continent likewise, leaves no doubt that the policy of the French Government is—or at least *was*, previous to Garibaldi's expedition—about to take a forward step in its secretly cherished projects of ambition on the Rhine. These projects may be attained in two ways,—either by bribing Prussia into acquiescence, or by coercing her into compliance by

offers a salve where he demands a sacrifice, he certainly has it in view to strip us of vantage-ground in the Mediterranean which we will never consent to abandon of our free will.

"We are not painting a distant future, but one at hand. The present peace will not last long. And in the meantime the French Emperor will do his best to 'reassure' Europe, and to reinstate himself in his old character as a friend of peace. He wishes peace for the present; and he still more wishes to be thought to wish it. Napoleon not only desires peace for the hour, but he has no intention to take any direct part in the next (*i. e.*, Turkish) war. All that he will have to do then, is to keep England from interfering. Possibly the Grand-Duke Constantine of Russia—who has visited in succession the French Emperor, the King of Greece, and the Sultan, and who is now on a visit to our own country—may at this moment be unfolding, in confidence to our Government, some scheme by which England may be propitiated into approval of, or at least passive acquiescence in, the approaching inroad upon Turkey. But if we refuse to be so propitiated, to the navies of France and Russia it is relegated to tame our pride, and chain us up in our island-home."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, Sept. 1859.

the conjoined power of intrigue and arms. The Emperor of the French has of late been playing both of these games simultaneously. On the one hand he approaches the Prussian Government with protestations of amity, and solicits her acquiescence in his ambitious projects by suggesting that she shall be aggrandized in return by the incorporation of the adjoining States of northern Germany. On the other hand, he has been fomenting the discord between Prussia and the secondary States of the Confederacy, and also between Prussia and Denmark, in order to leave the Court of Berlin comparatively helpless in the event of its refusal to submit peaceably to his annexation of the Rhenish provinces. And the camp at Chalons, where 40,000 men are assembled, is in truth the centre of an army of observation now concentrating along the frontiers of Germany, ready on the shortest notice to carry the Imperial eagles across the Rhine. In flagrant disregard of his principle of "popular rights," the French Emperor has even concluded an agreement with Denmark, guaranteeing to that Power her German provinces of Schleswig and

Holstein on condition that in the event of war she range herself on the side of France. And as France and Russia are doubtless prepared to engage in a war with England rather than halt in their projects of aggrandizement on the Rhine and the Danube, it is obvious that an alliance with Denmark—which would at once bar the entrance to the Baltic, and materially increase the naval forces of the Russo-Gallic League—would be of inestimable advantage to them in a conflict with the mistress of the seas.

II.

THE alliance between Russia and France cannot last long. The late Czar was right in judging that England was his more natural ally; and although a high morality forbade our becoming in 1853 a participant in the Muscovite plan for dismembering Turkey, the present Czar will find that in accepting the tergiversation and responding to the overtures of the French Government, he is leaning upon a reed that will pierce his hand. Napoleon well knows the colossal power and impenetrable panoply of Russia, and has no desire to increase her strength. Each of the two Powers co-operates with the other for its own ends: but does not Russia see that hitherto it is France alone that is realizing her ambition, while the Muscovite plans are still relegated to the future? By means of the Russian alliance, Napoleon was able to intervene in Italy, and appear in the character alike of a military conqueror and of a national liberator. By the countenance of Russia he was able to seize Nice and Savoy, and destroy

the barriers of neutrality which protected Switzerland and Italy. Strong in the same alliance, he also spreads discord throughout Germany, and aspires after the frontier of the Rhine. If he once obtain that object, Russia will find him become lukewarm in the alliance, and not unwilling to enter into new combinations by which Russia may be balked of her prey. In any case the curtain will not drop upon this grand drama until Napoleon, representing the popular principle, will lead the forces of Western Europe once more against the semi-oriental absolutism of Russia. Death or discomfiture may unexpectedly cut short the career of this second Napoleon; but we warn Russia that if the Imperial democrat be successful, she will yet be the object of one of his very deadliest blows. While the Court of St. Petersburg is patiently hoping for the prize at Constantinople, Napoleon is rapidly gathering in his harvest. While Russia aims at the Bosphorus, he will seize the Rhine;—and how will the case stand afterwards? The great influence which Russia used to possess in Germany has been changed into antipathy by her alliance with

France; and when, through this alliance, the Fatherland has been thrown into turmoil and humiliated by France, the hatred of the Germanic race towards Russia will be intense. And if Napoleon, in his usual style, then adroitly makes friends with the Germans at the expense of his ally, and direct their wrath against Russia, is the Muscovite Colossus likely to come unharmed out of such a contest? Will not Germany, if robbed of her Rhine provinces, retort her wrongs upon Russia by seeking to strip her of Poland, and create a kingdom of Warsaw as a bulwark against the Czars? And will not the French Emperor be the very first to suggest such a revenge? When lamenting, in his *Ideas*, over the failure of so many of his Uncle's projects, the present Emperor expressed at once a longing desire and a firm assurance that, despite all the efforts of Russia, the resurrection of the Polish nationality will yet take place. "Poland," he says, "that sister of France, always so devoted, always so magnanimous, may hope for a not distant resurrection: the creation of the duchy of Warsaw by the Emperor ought to serve as the nucleus of a complete nationality."

The Czar Alexander will do well to ponder these words, and to remember that, even if these words had never been written, or had not been republished in the Emperor's works, the issue to which they point would still have been one of the "ideas" which Napoleon seeks to accomplish, and for which he will be ready to make war. The Czar Paul became an ally of France in his madness, and was strangled. Alexander I., fascinated by Napoleon I., made a similar mistake, and, after seeing Moscow burnt, had to capture Paris. Again the dreams of ambition obscure the judgment of the Czars, and the nephew of the first Alexander will yet be taught a lesson of suffering through his alliance with the nephew of the first Napoleon.

III.

WHEN her enemies are allying themselves, and storms are gathering in the horizon of Europe, what is the position of England? She is being pressed back by half-inches; and each time she recedes before the action of her Imperial neighbour, she says, "It is too small an affair to go to war about." This is precisely what Napoleon desires: it is to obtain this result that he so warily regulates his pressure. He is not ready for open war with England. He will not rush into a contest with the Land of Freedom while a revolutionary war is possible in Italy, which, if supported by England, might extend to his own subjects: neither does he think that the ties are sufficiently loosened which connect us with the German Powers. It suffices him at present to exhibit England as constantly compelled to give way to his plans. He seeks to humiliate before he attempts to destroy her. He seeks to persuade the other States that England has neither the spirit nor the power to help them, and that their

true course is to ally themselves with France. The Coalition is at work, but it is no longer England that is the leader of it. She hugs herself in her neutrality, and does nothing. She forgets that the loss of allies is a bad security for peace, and that neutrality is simply an opportunity for her enemies to choose their own time for attacking her.

Four years have elapsed since the writer of these pages, on the conclusion of the treaty of Paris, warned the public that the Peace had settled nothing, that fresh wars and new coalitions were impending, and that England could not afford to go to sleep,—that Russia adhered to her hereditary policy,—that Turkey was disintegrating,—Italy on the eve of exploding; and that "the future does not promise to be such as accords with the interests of this country. Under pretext of re-adjusting the territorial system of Europe, and insuring the freedom of the European seas, a new Congress may demand of us the surrender of Heligoland as pertaining to Germany—of Gibraltar, as part of Spain—of the Ionian Islands, as pertaining to Greece; and in the event of our

refusal, a naval confederacy may be formed to wrest those places from us."* As a means of preparing for such contingencies, we suggested the necessity of cultivating those natural alliances, which alone promised to be permanent. Pointing out France, Spain, and Russia as our enemies in the future, and Austria as likely to relapse under Russian influence, we said of Italy, that she "would have enough to do with her own miseries to think of helping others;" and we counselled our statesmen to regard Prussia—whose people are kindred to us in their Protestantism, half-kin in their blood, and with whom a most propitious royal alliance has since been contracted—and the Scandinavian States, as the best and surest quarters where England could look for support. Specially contemplating the contingency which now looms in the distance, of a naval confederacy being formed against England, we remarked:—"At present we have this advantage, that the fleet of Russia, which would constitute one-half of any naval confederacy against us, is blocked up by ice for half the year—thus permitting us during that

* Blackwood's Magazine, June 1856, p. 730.

time to direct our entire naval strength against the other fleets. But if Russia succeed in extending her ascendancy around the shores of the Baltic—if from Finland and the Aland Isles she dominate over Sweden and Denmark,—then we may expect to see the station of the Russian fleet advanced from Cronstadt to the harbours of Norway and Denmark, beyond the limits of the winter-ice; and the entrance to the Sound itself may virtually come into her hands. By an Unkiar-Skelessi treaty with Denmark, these Dardanelles of the North might become closed against the fleets of her enemies; and the long-range artillery now introduced would render the passage of the Sound in the teeth of the Danish batteries, as once done by Nelson, quite impracticable. Were Russia to succeed in taking up such a position, we must frankly say that the effectual guardianship of the British coasts would in times of war become impossible. A hostile fleet of thirty sail-of-the-line lying unassailable behind the Sound (within a few hours' sail of our coasts), and ready to issue out at a moment's notice,—how could we keep it in check? Manifestly, then,

the point above all others which we have to keep in view in our Continental policy, is to draw closer our alliance with Sweden and Denmark. These States are in a special manner our natural allies. With them we have no conflicting interests—no points of rivalry. Scandinavians and Northmen, they have the same blood in their veins as we; and the south of Denmark is the primal home of the people that have now given their name to England. Similar blood produces similar temperament and national character; and the love of freedom and a popular form of government characterize both Scandinavians and ourselves. The same love of the adventurous seafaring life is to be found, too, amongst them,—thus rendering them to us the most useful of all allies, or, if won to the opposite side, most formidable foes. The Danish Court inclines to Russia; and as the Danish law of succession now stands, the royal family of Russia may yet lay claim to the Danish throne. But the Danish people and Parliament are stoutly opposed to these Russian leanings of the Court; and ceaseless diplomatic efforts ought to be made by our Government to procure the

triumph of these national feelings. No pains would be too great if they won Denmark to the side of Britain."* No such diplomatic efforts, however, have been made. In the *laissez-aller* spirit natural to a government that is constantly changing its ministers, an alliance with the Scandinavian Powers has remained uncultivated and unsought. And now it is reported, on apparently good authority, that even France has supplanted us at the Court of Copenhagen.

If England prove true to herself, no one need despair of her future. But her policy must experience a development commensurate with the altered circumstances of the times. France, under her redoubtable leader, aspires to head the so-called Latin races of Europe; and although Russia at present, and Germany if united, have each a population adequate to balance a confederacy of the Latin States, England must sink in the scale of power if she do not meet the emergency by an analogous organization. She must seek to draw closer the bonds which unite her with the scattered fragments of the British race.

* Blackwood's Magazine, June 1856, p. 730.

It is time that she should amply reap the benefit of her colonies; of that vast system of enterprise and emigration which will be the most enduring monument of her greatness. She has spread over the earth like a gigantic banyan-tree, dropping in every quarter of the globe roots which in turn become trees like herself and forming part of herself, so that no storms should ever prevail to throw her down. If we look merely at the narrow British Isles alongside of the great States of the Continent, expanding in population to a greater extent than is possible with us, and tending to unite themselves in the still larger aggregations of Race, our heart might fail us for the meteor-flag of England; but when we lift our eyes beyond the seas, and see new Englands rising, and British blood and language dominating over a third of the inhabited earth, despondency must give way to a noble pride and confidence in her future. Already her colonies are ripe to take upon themselves the burden of their own maintenance and defence in ordinary times; and in seasons of emergency the aid she has so long extended to them will surely cease to be a one-sided obligation;—while in the growing

commerce subsisting among them, the Anglo-Saxon States would find ample scope for their industrial energies, though all the rest of the world were closed against them. Peace will dawn on the world by-and-by, though wars will never entirely cease as long as human nature remains what it is. But whether in peace or in war, we believe that no Power yet formed in the world will lastingly extinguish the glory of Britain. The dominion of the seas will cease to be hers exclusively, but only to merge in the grander maritime supremacy of the United Anglo-Saxon family. And whatever may be the Coalitions and Confederacies of the future, through the haze of years can be descried the coming of one greater than them all, in a Congress of the free Anglo-Saxon Powers of the Sea,—whose triumphs, sufficient in war, will shine forth most conspicuously in the better peaceful times a-coming—helping on that period when a Christianized civilization shall cover the earth "as the waters do the channels of the sea."

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